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INCORPORATING THE LAW OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
IN TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS CASES: GIVING
CHILDREN A VOICE THROUGH MATHEWS v. ELDRIDGE
JUDGE MICHAEL D. BUSTAMANTE*
INTRODUCTION
After a period of comparative neglect, academia, the courts, state legislatures, and
Congress have increasingly focused their attention on the vexing and too-frequently
tragic problem of child abuse and neglect.' Legislative reforms and judicial
decisions have changed the substantive and procedural standards applicable at the
agency level and in the courts while at the same time increasing intervention efforts.
Generally, though not universally, these changes have worked to increase the level
of procedural precision and protection available to families embroiled in abuse-and-
neglect proceedings.2 Much of this increase in procedural protection has been
implemented in the courts by adoption and application of analogous criminal law
concepts. This process in the courts has been particularly virulent in cases where
termination of parental rights is actively pursued. Use of constitutionally driven
criminal law concepts in concededly civil proceedings reflects the adversarial nature
of abuse-and-neglect proceedings and the interests, public and private, they impact.
Given the resourcefulness of counsel, the courts can expect more efforts to expand
the reach of criminal law protections for the benefit of abuse-and-neglect
respondents.
I start with the view that increased procedural protection is appropriate given that
termination of parental rights (TPR) proceedings involve one of the most cherished
of human relationships. Current concern for procedural rigor is a welcome change
from prior law, which accorded the state in its role of parens patriae broad powers
of interference with minimal regard for due process. The decisions adapting criminal
law concepts, however, have for the most part done so without a cohesive evaluative
tool to test the propriety and wisdom of doing so.
Following a brief review of parens patriae in the child protection context and a
survey of current case law, I will suggest a child-modified version of the Mathews
v. Eldridge3 balancing test as a tool to be used when considering requests for
expansion. Finally, I will apply the modified test to certain specific issues that
regularly appear in TPR cases.
* Judge Bustamante, a UNM Law School graduate, has been on the New Mexico Court of Appeals since
December 1994. This article was written in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Master of Laws
in the Judicial Process at the University of Virginia.
1. 1 am not the first to make this observation. See Amy Sinden, "Why Won't Mom Cooperate?": A Critique
of Informality in Child Welfare Proceedings, I I YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 339. See also The Adoption and Safe
Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115. In addition, the INDEX TO LEGAL PERIODICALS in its
September 1991 through August 1992 edition for the first time separated "Termination of parental rights" from the
general "Infants" category as an index subject. INDEX TO LEGAL PERIODICALS, SUBJECT AND AUTHOR INDEX 31
(Stephen Rosen ed., Sept. 1991-Aug. 1992).
2. Throughout this article I will use "abuse and neglect" as a synonym for termination of parental rights
(TPR) cases. There is a distinction to be drawn between abuse, neglect, and termination. The institution of an abuse-
and-neglect proceeding does not necessarily end in termination. In New Mexico, however, and in most other states
of which the author is aware, abuse-and-neglect proceedings are provided for in the same statutory scheme as
termination proceedings, and one can become the other quite easily.
3. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
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I. HISTORY
The American history of societal responses-private, sectarian and
governmental-to child abuse and neglect is well documented.' There is neither
space nor time enough to review that history here. I will confine myself to the use
made by the courts of the parens patriae concept.
Black's Law Dictionary gives the following entry for parens patriae:
[L]iterally "parent of the country," refers traditionally to role of state as
sovereign and guardian of persons under legal disability, such as juveniles or the
insane, and in child custody determinations, when acting on behalf of the state
to protect the interests of the child. It is the principle that the state must care for
those who cannot take care of themselves, such as minors who lack proper care
and custody from their parents. It is a concept of standing utilized to protect
those quasi-sovereign interests such as health, comfort and welfare of the people,
interstate water rights, general economy of the state, etc.
This definition, if accurate, is barely distinguishable from thc police power and
is different from the power described in nineteenth-century cases upholding the
constitutionality of early dependency and neglect statutes. For example, in Exparte
Crouse,7 the mother of a seven-year-old child had committed the child to the local
refuge house. The father of the child brought a habeas corpus action seeking release
of the child. The writ was refused, and on appeal the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
upheld the constitutionality of the neglect statute by observing,
The House of Refuge is not a prison, but a school. Where reformation, and not
punishment, is the end, it may indeed be used as a prison for juvenile convicts
who would else be committed to a common gaol; and in respect to these, the
constitutionality of the act which incorporated it, stands clear of
controversy .... The object of the charity is reformation, by training its inmates
to industry; by imbuing their minds with principles of morality and religion; by
furnishing them with means to earn a living; and, above all, by separating them
4. See Mason P. Thomas, Jr., Child Abuse and Neglect Part 1: Historical Overview, Legal Matrix and
Societal Perspectives, 50 N.C. L. REV. 293 (1972) and sources cited therein. See also, Note, The Parens Patriae
Theory and Its Effect on the Constitutional Limits of Juvenile Court Powers, 27 U. PITT. L. REV. 894 (1966).
5. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1114 (6th ed. 1990) (citations omitted).
6. Typical of nineteenth-century child neglect statutes was the Wisconsin law adopted in 1875:
[A child is subject to commitment who) is begging or receiving alms, whether actually, or under
pretense of selling or offering for sale anything, or being in any public street or place for the
purpose of begging or receiving alms; or that is found wandering and not having any home or
settled place of abode, proper guardianship, or means of subsistence; or is found destitute either
by being an orphan or having a parent or parents who is undergoing imprisonment, or otherwise;
or that frequents the company of reputed thieves or of lewd, wanton or lascivious persons in
speech or behavior, or notorious resorts of bad characters; or that is found wandering in streets,
alleys or public places, and belonging to that class of children called "ragpickers" or that is an
inmate of any house of ill fame or poor house, whether in company with its parent or parents or
otherwise; or who has been abandoned in any way by his parent or parents or guardians; or who
is without means of subsistence or support.
Act of Mar. 5, 1875, ch. 325, § 5, 1875 Wis. Laws 633. As of 1970, Montana, Pennsylvania, and Texas still had like
provisions in force. See MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 10-501 (1947); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 243(5)(f) (1965); TEX.
REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2330 (amended 1969).
7. 4 Whart. 9 (Pa. 1839).
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from the corrupting influence of improper associates. To this end may not the
natural parents, when unequal to the task of education, or unworthy of it, be
superseded by the parens patriae, or common guardian of the community? It is
to be remembered that the public has a paramount interest in the virtue andknowledge of its members, and that of strict right; the business of educationbelongs to it. That parents are ordinarily entrusted with it is because it can
seldom be put into better hands; but where they are incompetent or corrupt, what
is there to prevent the public from withdrawing their faculties, held, as they
obviously are, at its sufferance? The right of parental control is a natural, but not
an unalienable one. It is not excepted by the declaration of rights out of the
subjects of ordinary legislation .....
Courts in the nineteenth century refused all objections to these neglect statutes on
the basis of the benevolent intent and assumed beneficial effect of the laws. This
approach, the notion that the state could do as it pleased because it had succeeded
to the position of parent, was nearly unanimous among the states through the first
decades of the twentieth century.9 By 1905, the Massachusetts Supreme Court could
express its parens patriae power as follows:
To save a child from becoming a criminal, or from continuing in a career of
crime, to end in maturer years in public punishment and disgrace, the Legislature
surely may provide for the salvation of such a child, if its parents or guardian be
unable or unwilling to do so, by bringing it into one of the courts of the state
without any process at all, for the purpose of subjecting it to the state's
guardianship and protection. The natural parent needs no process to temporarily
deprive his child of its liberty by confining it in his own home, to save it and to
shield it from the consequences of persistence in a career of waywardness; noris the state, when compelled, as parens patriae, to take the place of the father for
the same purpose, required to adopt any process as a means of placing its hands
upon the child to lead it into one of its courts. When the child gets there, and the
court, with the power to save it, determines on its salvation, and not its
punishment, it is immaterial how it got there.' °
The early neglect statutes were not by their terms parental termination provisions.
They were designed to allow commitment of children to "reform schools," refugehouses, industrial schools, or apprenticeship programs. Strictly speaking, these
statutes only deprived parents of custody, not their entire bundle of parental rights.
In reality, the effect was much the same as termination. Since the design of the
statutes was to remove children from their improper circumstances and then to mold
them into law-abiding citizens, the fact that parents might be deprived of a child was
of little import."'
8. Id. at II.
9. Milwaukee Indus. Sch. v. Supervisor of Milwaukee County, 40 Wis. 328 (1876); Farnham v. Pierce, 6N.E. 830 (Mass. 1886); Ex Parte Ah Peen, 51 Cal. 280 (1876); State ex rel. Olson v. Brown, 52 N.W. 935 (Minn.1892); In re Ferrier, 103 Ill. 367 (1882); County of McLean v. Humphreys, 104 Ill. 378 (1882); Roth v. House of
Refuge, 31 Md. 329 (1869).
10. Commonwealth v. Fisher, 62 A. 198 (Pa. 1905).
11. A. PLATT, THE CHILD SAVERS: THE INVENTION OF DELINQUENCY 108-17 (1969).
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There were very few nineteenth-century cases refusing to grant the state such
broad power under the aegis of parens patriae. 2 In State ex rel O'Connell v. Turner,
the Illinois Supreme Court held the state's reform school act unconstitutional. There,
the child Daniel was committed to the Chicago Reform School under a provision
that allowed "any police magistrate or justice of the peace" to cause to be arrested
and brought before a circuit court judge "any boy or girl, within the ages of six or
sixteen years, who he has reason to believe is a vagrant, or is destitute of proper
parental care, or is growing up in mendicancy, ignorance, idleness or vice."' 3
Daniel's father sought a writ of habeas corpus to set Daniel free. Observing that
Daniel had been arrested and confined "for misfortune,"' 4 the court launched a
scathing attack on the basic theory underlying the neglect and dependency statutes.
The opinion, very modem in its view of parental rights and responsibilities,
standards of parental care, and children's rights, was severely criticized at the time. 5
Though essentially, but not explicitly, reversed eighteen years later,' 6 O'Connell
survives today for its standard for parental conduct supporting state intervention:
"gross misconduct or almost total unfitness on the part of the parent.. .clearly
proved."' 7
It is important to emphasize that the dependency and neglect statutes and the
cases discussed above all predate the juvenile delinquency reform movement
launched by the creation of the first juvenile court in Chicago. 8 By that time, the
parens patriae approach to child welfare was universally accepted as constitutional,
wise policy. Also, there was general agreement among reformers at the time that
there was no and should be no real distinction between neglected and dependent
children and juvenile criminal offenders. ' Thus, the new juvenile courts were given
the power to intervene in criminal and neglect contexts under much the same
informal procedures, further blurring the line between the two types of cases.
Still, in the early part of the twentieth century, neglect statutes did not include as
a specific aim or power the final termination of parental rights. It was not until the
1950s that state legislatures began adopting statutes that explicitly provided for
termination at the request of the state as a means of permanently separating children
from their parents.2" These statutes, containing similar definitions of neglect and
dependency and authorizing similarly informal procedures, were not complete
departures from prior law.2' These informal procedures reflected settled notions of
12. See State ex rel. O'Connell v. Turner, 55 111. 280 (1870); State ex rel. Cunningham v. Ray, 63 N.H. 406
(1885).
13. O'Connell, 55 111. at 282.
14. Id.
15. Thomas, Jr., supra note 4, at 320-2 1.
16. See County of Cook v. Chicago Indus. Sch. for Girls, 18 N.E. 183 (111. 1888).
17. O'Connell, 55 Ill. at 284-85.
18. 1899 Ill. Laws 131.
19. Thomas, Jr., supra note 4, at 322; PLATT, supra note 1i, at 116-17.
20. See Note, Legislative and Judicial Recognition of the Distinction Between Custody and Termination
Orders in Child Custody Cases, 7 J. FAM. L 66 (1967); see also Note, Termination of Parental Rights, 13 WYO.
L.J. 185 (1958); Statutory Note, Infants-Termination of Parental Rights, 14 KAN. L. REV. 117 (1965); H. Gordon,
Terminal Placements of Children and Permanent Termination of Parental Rights: The New York Permanent Neglect
Statute, 46 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 215 (1971).
21. See Note, Dependency and Neglect: Indiana's Definitional Confusion, 45 IND. L.J. 606 (1969).
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the state's parens patriae power to step literally into the shoes of parents. Allowing
termination of parental rights as an end result raised concerns about the sufficiency
of the process being accorded parents, leading to the challenges that resulted in the
United States Supreme Court's decisions we will now explore.22
II. "FUNDAMENTAL" FAMILY RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT
As noted in the discussion above, a very limited number of state court decisions
in the nineteenth century accorded the parent/child relationship a preferred status,
subject to interference by the state, only upon a showing of serious misconduct on
the part of the parent.2 However, the United States Supreme Court did not speak on
the subject until its decision in Meyer v. Nebraska.24 Courts and commentators
recognize Meyer as the progenitor of the view that parents possess a fundamental
right under the United States Constitution to control the education of their children.
The actual language of the opinion is at once more expansive and less clear than the
proposition for which it is cited:
While this court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty thus
guaranteed, the term has received much consideration and some of the included
things have been definitely stated. Without doubt, it denotes not merely freedom
from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in
any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry,
establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates
of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized
at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men. 5
Meyer is an odd vehicle to produce this statement in that it was an appeal by a
teacher, not a parent, who had been convicted under a Nebraska statute making it a
crime to teach any language other than English to children who had not "attained
and successfully passed the eighth grade."26
Meyer was followed two years later by Pierce v. Society of Sisters,27 another
unlikely vehicle for a declaration of parental rights. Pierce arose as a challenge by
22. The lower federal courts had begun to intervene, finding state termination statutes unconstitutional on
vagueness and other grounds. See Alsager v. Dist. of Polk County, 406 F. Supp. 10 (S.D. Iowa 1975); Roe v. Conn,
417 F. Supp. 769 (M.D. Ala. 1976) (holding unconstitutional a statute that allowed seizure of a child without notice
or hearing if the "child is in such condition that its welfare requires" it. In the particular case at issue, an order had
been entered for seizure of a white child living in a predominantly black neighborhood with her mother and
mother's boyfriend. No allegations of neglect or mistreatment as such were made to support the seizure.); see also
Note, Due Process and the Fundamental Right to Family Integrity: A Re-evaluation of South Dakota's Parental
Termination Statute, 24 S.D. L. REV. 447 (1979).
23. See O'Connell v. Turner, 55 Ill. 280 (1870).
24. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
25. Id. at 399.
26. Id. at 397. Meyer has been subjected to critical review in the last few years. See Barbara Bennett
Woodhouse, "Who Owns the Child?": Meyer and Pierce and the Child as Property, 33 WM. & MARY L REV. 995
(1992). Woodhouse argues that Meyer was more a reaction by Justice McReynolds to a rapidly changing social
climate than a progressive or "liberal" expression. The article further argues that the emphasis in the opinion on
individualism and property or ownership concepts actually worked to decrease children's claims to independent
constitutional rights.
27. 268 U.S. 510 (1924).
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a parochial school and a military academy of an Oregon statute that required all
students between the ages of eight and sixteen to attend public schools only. The
schools grounded their challenge on their own property rights and on the parents'
Fourteenth Amendment liberty rights to direct the education of their children. Citing
only Meyer, the Court held the following:
Under the doctrine of Meyer, we think it entirely plain that the Act of 1922
unreasonably interferes with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the
upbringing and education of children under their control. As often heretofore
pointed out, rights guaranteed by the Constitution may not be abridged by
legislation which has no reasonable relation to some purpose within the
competency of the state. The fundamental theory of liberty upon which all
governments in this Union repose excludes any general power of the state to
standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction from public
teachers only. The child is not the mere creature of the state; those who nurture
him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to
recognize and prepare him for additional obligations.28
The Court next alluded to the constitutional significance of parental rights in
Prince v. Massachusetts29 when it enforced the state's child labor law to prevent a
guardian from requiring (or allowing) a nine-year-old child to distribute religious
pamphlets on the street. While acknowledging again the primacy of parental
control,3" the Court held that child labor laws did not inappropriately interfere with
parental authority or the free exercise of the child's religion. The Court generally
noted the peculiar vulnerability of children in contrast to adults and the state's
concomitantly broader authority to limit children's activities for their general benefit
and welfare.3 The Court held that the law prohibiting sale of anything on the street
by boys under twelve and girls under eighteen was a reasonable provision for their
protection. The Court made no effort to demonstrate the kind of compelling state
interest normally associated with regulation of rights deemed fundamental elements
of our liberty under the Fourteenth Amendment. It apparently assumed that the
state's general parens patriae interest was sufficient.
Following Meyer, Pierce, and Prince, and leading up to Lassiter v. Department
of Social Services32 and Santosky v. Kramer,33 the United States Supreme Court
issued a number of opinions dealing with parental and more general family rights
that confuse if not weaken the Court's view as to the nature and strength of parental
Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest rights. Critical review of the Court's
sometimes contradictory statements has been undertaken by others and need not be
pursued in detail here.34 There is one constant throughout the cases, however: When
28. Id. at 534-35 (citations omitted).
29. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
30. Id. at 166 ("It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents,
whose primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder.").
31. Id. at 166-67 (noting the unchallenged enforceability of school attendance laws, mandatory vaccination
laws, healthcare decisions, and child labor laws).
32. 452 U.S. 18 (1981).
33. 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
34. Francis Barry McCarthy, The Confused Constitutional Status and Meaning of Parental Rights, 22 GA.
L. REV. 975 (1988). The author details perceived theoretical and doctrinal weaknesses and contradictions in the
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Meyer, Pierce, and Prince are mentioned, they are cited with approval as authority
for the idea that the parent/child \relationship is a fundamental liberty interest
deserving heightened protection from state intrusion.3" Approval of this view holds
true generally even in the dissents, where disagreements center on the
reasonableness of the state regulation or procedure rather than the basic
constitutional principle.36 Thus, Meyer and Pierce have survived the Supreme
Court's attempt to escape its Lochner legacy.
3 7
A. Application in Specific Cases
The United States Supreme Court did not have occasion to apply the principles
of its Meyer line of cases to a specific "parental termination" or TPR case until
Stanley v. Illinois." In Stanley, the Court, on substantive due process and equal
protection grounds, declared unconstitutional a statute that conclusively presumed
unwed fathers to be unfit to have custody of their children. The Court made clear
that unwed fathers also have a "cognizable and substantial" interest in retaining
custody of their children39 and that interest could not be destroyed by a blanket
presumption of unfitness. The Court emphasized that the "integrity of the family
unit has found protection in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Ninth
Amendment." The Court held that fitness must be determined on an individual
basis, which requires a hearing. The state could not justify its "procedure by
Court's "parental" rights, "family" rights, and, to some extent, "privacy" jurisprudence, making the argument that
there is no real basis for the notion that parental rights are or should be deemed fundamental under the Fourteenth
Amendment.
35. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974); see also Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S.
494 (1977); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978); Smith v. Org. of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816 (1977); Lehr
v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983); Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18 (1981); Santosky v. Kramer, 455
U.S. 745 (1982); Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
36. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 79 (Thomas, J., concurring); id. at 86 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 91 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting); id. at 94 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
37. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (holding unconstitutional a state law limiting work hours for
bakers because the statute was an arbitrary interference with the freedom to contract guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment). Lochner has come to symbolize a broad, and now officially abandoned, approach to use of substantive
due process that allows "courts to hold law unconstitutional when they believe the legislature has acted unwisely."
Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730 (1963). The Lochner approach was used repeatedly to strike down
"progressive" labor legislation by the states. Id. at 729. The Court is ever concerned about the appropriate
application of substantive due process but has clearly not discarded it entirely. See 530 U.S. at 75-76 (Souter, J.,
concurring); see also id. at 81 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Meyer and Pierce probably escaped Lochner because of the
overriding value we place on the parent-child relationship and the concomitant reluctance to allow undue
governmental interference with it.
38. 405 U.S. 645 (1972). But see Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965). The Armstrong Court did hold
that failure to give notice to a divorced father of adoption proceedings involving his children was unconstitutional
and required setting aside the adoption decree and granting a new trial; however, Armstrong did not cite any of the
Meyer line of cases, simply stating that "as to the basic requirement of notice itself there can be no doubt, where,
as here, the result of the judicial proceeding was permanently to deprive a legitimate parent of all that parenthood
implies." Id. at 550.
39. 405 U.S. at 651-52.
40. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 651 (citations omitted). The Court cited Meyer in support of the due process ground;
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942), in support of the Equal Protection ground; and Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479 (1965), in support of the Ninth Amendment ground. The Court characterized the parents as follows:
"The private interest here, that of a man in the children he has sired and raised, undeniably warrants deference and,
absent a powerful countervailing interest, protection." Stanley, 405 U.S. at 651.
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presumption"4 on the basis of efficiency. Finally, the Court was careful to note that
a parent's interest in his children is stronger than interests derived from shifting
economic arrangements.42
Faced with a less-responsible and less-involved father, a married mother, and a
different statutory scheme, the Court struck a new balance and perhaps formulated
a new rule in Quilloin v. Walcott.43 The Court paid tribute to its prior holdings that
the parent/child relationship is constitutionally protected"4 and even quoted Justice
Stewart's concurring opinion from Smith v. Organization of Foster Families45 but
quickly distinguished its prior cases. The Court found it significant that the father
in Quilloin had never had custody of the child and that adoption over his objection
would not place the child with new, unknown parents. Rather, the child's current
family unit would be fully recognized. These two factors were enough for the Court
to allow the adoption solely on the basis of the best interests of the child. The Court
made no further effort to describe the countervailing rights of the mother or the child
that outweighed or devalued the father's interest. The Court made no mention of the
state's interest-whether it simply mirrored the mother and child's or whether its
interests were strengthened because of the comparative attractiveness of the outcome
for the child. As such, the decision can be interpreted as an implicit recognition that
the strength, perhaps even the validity, of a parent's claim to substantive due process
protection may be materially affected by the countervailing claims of his children
and his own actions towards them.'
The Court made this notion explicit in the remarkable case of Lehr v. Robertson.47
In Lehr the Court upheld the adoption of an unwed father's two-year-old daughter
even though the state court did not give him notice of the proceedings initially and
later refused to allow him to intervene when he discovered, almost inadvertently,
that the adoption proceedings were ongoing.48 The father in Lehr had not married
his child's mother or otherwise formally legitimated her as of the time the adoption
proceedings were started. He had also failed to register himself with the state's
"putative father registry," which would have entitled him to notice of the adoption
proceeding. It is undisputed, however, that the mother had actual knowledge of the
father's address when she started the adoption proceeding with her then-husband.
It is also clear that the trial court had actual notice before it approved the adoption
that the father had initiated his own "visitation and paternity petition," apparently
41. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 656.
42. Id. at 651.
43. 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
44. Id. at 255 (citing Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972)).
45. Id ("We have little doubt that the Due Process Clause would be offended '[i]f a State were to attempt
to force the breakup of a natural family, over the objections of the parents and their children, without some showing
of unfitness and for the sole reason that to do so was thought to be in the children's best interest."' Smith v.
Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 862-63 (1977) (Stewart, J., concurring in judgment)).
46. Whether this is contrary to the Court's mantra that constitutional protection depends not on the weight
of a person's interest but on the nature of the interest being invaded by the State is beyond the scope of this article.
See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570-71 (1972); see also Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 270-72
(1983) (White, J., dissenting).
47. 463 U.S. 248 (1983).
48. The factual background concerning the father's efforts to be a father to the child is open to question, as
shown by the contrasting statements of facts given by the majority and dissent. Compare id. at 251-53, and id. at
268-71 (White, J., dissenting).
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unaware of the adoption action. Despite significant unresolved factual discrepancies
about the father's efforts to establish a parent/child relationship and despite the
procedural peculiarity of the case, the Court held that due process did not afford the
father any more protection than he had received.
The Lehr opinion self-consciously sets about to determine the "precise nature of
the private interest that is threatened by the State" in this "novel context., 49 The
opening passage of its analysis presages the result: "The intangible fibers that
connect parent and child have infinite variety. They are woven throughout the fabric
of our society, providing it with strength, beauty, and flexibility. It is self-evident
that they are sufficiently vital to merit constitutional protection in appropriate
cases. ' 5° The Court went on to highlight the importance of developed relationships
between parents and children in its jurisprudence, citing Meyer and Pierce more for
their emphasis on the "high duty" of parents to prepare their children for "additional
obligations" than for the core notion of parental rights.5 Using its observation in
Caban v. Mohammed5 2 that "[p]arental rights do not spring full-blown from the
biological connection between parent and child" as a springboard, the Lehr Court
squarely held that "the mere existence of a biological link does not merit equivalent
constitutional protection" to a "fully" developed parental relationship.53 An inchoate
relationship, the missed opportunity to be a parent, apparently does not deserve
constitutional protection of the most basic sort: notice and a hearing before
judgment.
As in Quilloin, the Court in Lehr did not undertake an explicit analysis of the
nature of the conflicting interests-the child's, mother's, step-father's, the
state's-at work in circumstances such as Lehr. Perhaps it felt no need to do so
because of the scant regard it gave the "mere biological link" the father possessed.
The Court's no-constitutional-right approach may be correct in the abstract or as
applied in the fringe case, but few litigated cases will present such a stark, limited
connection between parent and child. It is important to explore whether the Court
is actually, albeit silently, conducting an informal balance in favor of quick and
painless resolution of adoption questions, thus promoting stability for the children
and their actual caregivers but devaluing parental interests. If the Court is weighing
interests in this way, its approach carries implications for the substantive and
procedural protections required and advisable for parents, including the extent to
which the criminal law provides an appropriate model for emulation. If the Court
has made a policy decision to err on the side of protecting the child at the cost of the
natural parent's desire to be a parent, the perceived need for protection may
decrease. The facts in Lehr do not support this conclusion. The adoption in Lehr was
by the mother's current husband. Thus, the child was not being deprived of both
natural parents and in this sense the circumstances echo Quilloin. Also, as we shall
49. 463 U.S. at 256.
50. Id. at 256.
51. Id at257.
52. 441 U.S. 380, 397 (1979).
53. 463 U.S. at 260-61.
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see, the Court's more recent cases do not support the policy shift, which might have
been read into the holding in Lehr.4
B. Criminal Procedure as a Guide in the Supreme Court
The United States Supreme Court first examined the analogy between procedures
in TPR and criminal cases in Lassiter v. Department of Social Services,55 a case
involving seemingly strong facts in favor of termination. The mother's only
argument before the Court was that she had a Fourteenth Amendment right to court-
appointed counsel because she was indigent. The Court ruled that appointment of
counsel for indigent parents is not required in every case, but might be in some.
Noting that due process requires fundamental fairness rather than any particular
procedure, the Court started its analysis by surveying the decisions where a right to
appointed counsel had been found. 6 Not surprisingly, it identified a pattern: Counsel
had been required only in cases where a litigant faced the prospect of losing his
physical liberty if he lost. 7 The Court recognized that loss of physical liberty could
occur in supposedly non-criminal contexts such as juvenile delinquency
proceedings58 and involuntary mental health commitment proceedings.59 Thus, the
Court made clear that the right to counsel was not limited to instances required by
the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution. The Court further noted that even in
situations arguably subject to the Sixth Amendment, the right was diluted as the
person's expectation of personal liberty weakened' or was not directly threatened.6
From these cases, the Court drew a presumption that an indigent has a right to
counsel only when a loss in the case threatens his physical liberty. The Court did not
explain what policy considerations or legal concepts prompted recognition of this
presumption or why creation of the presumption was necessary or wise. Neither did
the Court explain the relative strength of the presumption when subjected to
challenge. It simply stated the presumption.
The Court then held that the presumption against counsel could be overcome in
TPR cases only by examining the circumstances in individual cases, not types of
cases, under the familiar Mathews62 formula and comparing the result of the
54. But cf. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989). There the Court upheld the constitutionality of
a state statute that created a presumption, rebuttable only by the husband or wife, that a child born to a married
woman living with her husband is a child of the marriage. The statute precluded the probable biological father of
the child from even attempting to prove his paternity. The plurality opinion held that the biological father's interest
in proving and exercising his fatherhood did not rise to the level of a fundamental right under the Fourteenth
Amendment. Id. at 126-27. As such the statute only had to be rationally related to a real state interest, which it was.
See id. at 129-30. Again, this result does not speak to the fundamental rights of "real" parents.
55. 452 U.S. 18 (1981).
56. Id. at 24-27.
57. Id. at 25 (citing Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972)).
58. Id. (citing In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967)).
59. id. (citing Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980)).
60. Id. at 26 (citing Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973) (discussing the due process rights of a
probationer at a probation-revocation hearing); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (discussing the rights of
a parolee at a revocation hearing)).
61. Id. (citing Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979)).
62. Id. at 27 (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976)). Mathews involved hearing requirements
in Social Security cases, and it has been used most frequently in administrative contexts. It has been applied,
however, to civil and criminal cases. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979); see also Britton v. Rogers, 631
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Mathews process against the presumption. Clearly not willing to take the full, if
logical, step of granting a criminal-like right in a civil case, the Court's abstract
Mathews analysis is not convincing. The Court acknowledged that the parent/child
relationship is an important interest that "undeniably warrants deference... [and]
protection"63 and characterized the "parent's interests in the accuracy and injustice
in the decision to terminate.. .parental status" as a "commanding one. ' The Court
also noted that some parents may have an additional compelling interest in that
petitions to terminate are often based on or coupled with allegations of criminal
activity.65 The Court further observed that given the nature of our adversary system,
the "contest of interests may become unwholesomely unequal" in the absence of
counsel for one side.66
The Court found the state's countervailing interests minimally valuable. The
state's "pecuniary interest [in the form of shorter, less formal hearings and the cost
of counsel] is legitimate but hardly significant enough to overcome private interests
as important as those here.... "67 Interestingly, the Court did not purport to factor the
state's parens patriae interest in the welfare of the child into the formula.
The Court's assessment of the risk of error is odd. The Court detailed the state's
statutory scheme controlling TPR cases, emphasizing the procedures and evidentiary
requirements to be met before termination could be ordered. The Court emphatically
did not agree with the state's assertion that hearings and proceedings under the
statute were well within the abilities of most persons to navigate by themselves.68
Yet, when it set the net weight of the Mathews factors against the no-right-to-
counsel presumption, the notion that "the complexity of the proceeding and the
incapacity of the uncounseled parent could be, but would not always be, great
enough to make the risk of erroneous deprivation of the parent's rights
insupportably high"'69 became the deciding factor. The chance that a parent might
be able to handle the proceedings by himself convinced the Court that counsel was
not constitutionally required. Thus, the denial of counsel as a right ironically turned
on the factor of which counsel would have the most impact. The Court instead
decided to rely on a procedure it had abandoned as unworkable in the criminal
context7° and left the decision to provide counsel to be made on a case-by-case basis
by the trial judge."
The notion of creating a civil proceeding analog to the Sixth Amendment right
to counsel clearly gave the Supreme Court pause, though it is unclear why. If the
F.2d 572 (8th Cir. 1980). The Mathews formula is normally used to determine what process is due in a given
circumstance. It is not normally used to create a result that in turn is used as a separate, weighted factor in another
balancing process.
63. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 27 (quoting Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972)).
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 28.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 30-31 (noting that no other court, except for the judgment it was considering, had held that indigent
parents have no due process rights to counsel).
69. Id. at 31.
70. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 347-49 (Clark, J., concurring).
71. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 31-32. Interestingly, the Court rejected this approach when it imposed a clear-and-
convincing standard of proof in TPR cases.
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Court believes its rhetoric that parental or family rights are fundamental facets of
liberty and if the state's interests are as paltry as portrayed, a different decision
could easily have been supported in light of the adversarial nature of the
proceedings. The civil-versus-criminal proceeding aspect of the case should not
have been a serious obstacle after the Court's decision in In re Gault and Vitek v.
Jones; yet it clearly played a significant role. Perhaps the prospect of a flood of new
rights was an unspoken concern. Whatever the deciding factor, the Court "blinked"
and failed to give proper recognition to the logical implications of its family rights
decisions.
The Court next explored these implications in Santosky v. Kramer,72 where the
Court considered the evidentiary standard of proof required to support a TPR
decision. The case originated in New York under a statute that allowed termination
upon a showing of permanent neglect provable under a "fair preponderance"
standard.73 The Court first noted that the fair preponderance standard was lower than
that required by a strong majority of the states.74 The court then cited Lassiter for the
idea that parents are constitutionally entitled to due process even as their right to be
parents is questioned. As the Court stated,
The fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and
management of their children does not evaporate simply because they have not
been model parents or have lost temporary custody of their child to the State.
Even when blood relationships are strained, parents retain a vital interest in
preventing the irretrievable destruction of their family life. If anything, persons
faced with forced dissolution of their parental rights have a more critical need
for procedure protections than do those resisting state intervention into ongoing
family affairs. When the State moves to destroy weakened familial bonds, it
must provide the parents with fundamentally fair procedures.7"
The Court was careful to note, albeit in a footnote, that the fact that the children
have potentially competing interests "does not justify denying the natural parents
constitutionally adequate procedures."76
The Court then applied the Mathews balancing test in a straightforward manner,
discarding any need for presumptions, unlike its approach in Lassiter. Viewing the
standard of proof as both a guide to the fact finder regarding the level of confidence
it should have in its decision and as a means of allocating the risk of error, the Court
held that the clear-and-convincing standard was constitutionally required in TPR
cases. The Court thus placed TPR cases somewhere in the middle of the continuum
running from civil disputes over money damages, where the risk of loss is basically
even, to criminal actions where the magnitude of the private interests affected has
72. 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
73. Id. at 748.
74. Id. at 750-5 1. At the time of this opinion, fifteen states, including New Mexico, statutorily required a
clear-and-convincing standard; fifteen states imposed a clear-and-convincing standard by opinion; and two states
required finding beyond a reasonable doubt, one by case law, State v. Robert H., 393 A.2d 1387 (N.H. 1978), and
one by statute, LA. REV. STAT. ANN., § 13:1603.A (repealed by Acts 1991, No. 235 § 17, effective Jan. 1, 1992).
See also Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, 25 U.S.C. § 1912(f) (1994) (requiring a finding beyond a reasonable
doubt for termination of parental rights in cases covered by it).
75. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 753-54.
76. Id. at 754 n.7.
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resulted in a standard that imposes "almost the entire risk of error" on society.77 The
Court equated TPR cases with other government-initiated actions such as civil
commitments and denaturalization proceedings that threaten significant deprivation
of liberty.
78
Two discussions in the opinion are relevant to this article. One revolves around
the nature of the private and public interests involved in TPR cases and assesses
their relative strength and position. The second, concerning the wisdom of
federalizing the evidentiary standard, is heavily influenced by resolution of the first.
The first discussion centers on the interplay between the interests of the parents,
the children, and the state.79 The majority regards parents and the state as the true,
perhaps the only, adversaries during the fact-finding stage of the abuse-and-neglect
process. In the majority opinion scenario, the fact-finding stage is when historical
facts are determined and remedial measures are undertaken.8" Parental fitness is
evaluated on an ongoing basis.
The majority opinion asserts that during fact finding, the focus of the proceeding
is not on the children, even though they are "deeply interested in the outcome."''. "At
the fact-finding, the State cannot presume that a child and his parents are
adversaries."82 Thus, during fact finding parents and children share the same "vital
interest in reducing the risk of error."83 According to the majority, it is only when
the parents are found to be unfit that the parents' and child's interests diverge.
Four justices disagree with this basic premise. The dissent finds a potential
conflict between parents and children from the start and is therefore unwilling to tip
the scales to make termination more difficult, at least in the face of a well-
considered legislative decision to the contrary.'
This difference in point of view drives the risk of error assessment. The majority
starts with a state-versus-parent view, which makes the state's power loom large and
potentially oppressive. For example, the majority likens some facets of the neglect
proceedings to a criminal trial.85 The majority is concerned with the imprecise
substantive standards used to determine neglect and unfitness, which "leave
determinations unusually open to the subjective values of the judge."86 The majority
is also concerned with the state's advantage in resources and its ability to shape the
historical events that can affect the decision to terminate.87 Finally, the majority
77. Id. at 755-56. The accuracy of this characterization is beyond the scope of this article.
78. Id.
79. The opinion also discusses foster family interests. I have chosen not to highlight their interest partly for
purposes of brevity and partly because I do not believe foster families should be given a voice separate from the
children (through their guardian ad litem) and the state.
80. See id. at 759-60. The Court's discussion is driven to some degree by the New York statutory scheme,
but the broad outlines of the process it describes fit the general scheme of abuse-and-neglect laws today. The statutes
all provide for proof of the facts supporting state intervention, a requirement that the state make appropriate efforts
to remedy the perceived problem, and a procedure for a final determination of parental fitness and termination.
81. Id. at759.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 788-90.
85. Id. at 762-63.
86. Id.
87. Id
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notes the "striking asymmetry" of litigation options (for example, no double
jeopardy defense) available to the state as opposed to parents. 88
The dissent is not concerned by these potential sources of error because it views
the state's interest as aligned with and enhanced by the child's interest. The minority
is more willing to allow an erroneous termination because it believes that the risk
of error in returning a child to a bad home is at least as great as in depriving the
child of a "good" parent. The majority specifically rejects this view as
"fundamentally mistaken., 89 The debate between the majority and the dissent
encapsulates the broad competing frames of reference evident in abuse-and-neglect
policy preferences. These divergent views continue to play themselves out in the
cases, as we shall see when we explore specific areas of the TPR civil/criminal
border later in this article. The dispute also helps inform formulation of the tool I
will propose. Before I discuss these issues, however, there is yet one more Supreme
Court decision to review.
In MLB v. SLJ,90 the United States Supreme Court frankly adopted a criminal law
rule to resolve a TPR issue. There, the mother's parental rights were terminated and
she sought to appeal. Indigent, her appeal ground to a halt when she was faced with
a $2352.36 prepayment requirement for the record. She sought to proceed forma
pauperis and was denied because the state did not recognize forma pauperis in civil
appeals. Holding that the state could not deny the mother a record, and thus her
appeal, the Court started its analysis with Griffin v. Illinois9' and then combined
Griffin with its Meyer, Pierce, Lassiter, and Santosky line of cases, making both
lines equally prominent support for its ruling.
The Court describes Griffin, a criminal case, as the "foundation case" ensuring
access to appeal.92 Griffin is a problematic case for the Court, not because of its
holding, which still enjoys wide acceptance by members of the Court, but because
of its indistinct doctrinal basis. The decision rests on a mixture of due process and
88. Id. at 764.
89. Id. at 765. The state court in addressing this issue agreed with the Santosky dissenters. In response the
majority stated,
The court's [New York Appellate Division] theory assumes that termination of the natural
parents' rights invariably will benefit the child. Yet we have noted above that the parents and the
child share an interest in avoiding erroneous termination. Even accepting the court's assumption
we cannot agree with its conclusion that a preponderance standard fairly distributes the risk of
error between parent and child. Use of that standard reflects the judgment that society is nearly
neutral between erroneous termination of parental rights and erroneous failure to terminate those
rights. For the child, the likely consequence of an erroneous failure to terminate is preservation
of an uneasy status quo. For the natural parents, however, the consequence of an erroneous
termination is the unnecessary destruction of their natural family. A standard that allocates the
risk of error nearly equally between those two outcomes does not reflect properly their relative
severity.
Id. at 765-66. The Court found that the notion that termination invariably will benefit the child was a "hazardous
assumption at best." Id. at 766 n.15 (referencing Michael S. Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of "Neglected"
Children: A Search for Realistic Standards, 27 STAN. L. REV. 985, 993 (1975)).
90. 519 U.S. 102 (1996). Following MLB, the Mississippi courts have given a remarkably pinched
interpretation of the case. See J.R.T. & K.T. v. Harrison County Family Court, 749 So. 2d 105 (Miss. 1999)
(refusing to allow a forma pauperis appeal on the sole ground that the order being appealed did not itself terminate
the parents rights).
91. 351 U.S. 12 (1996).
92. MLB, 519U.S. at 110.
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equal protection considerations, which the Court has never sorted through entirely.93
Resolution of the problem is probably not necessary in the criminal context because
the rule is so allied with the Sixth Amendment right to counsel and supported by our
general historical solicitude for the basic right to be physically free. In that context,
parsing the substantive due process right to an appeal at all (there is none)94 from the
inequitable effect of denying an appeal on the basis of wealth is not critical. The
implication that equal protection claims may be based on wealth need not be
examined because they can be limited to the safe harbor of criminal prosecutions.
That safe harbor is not available in cases usually deemed civil. Thus, it is
noteworthy that the Supreme Court chose the Griffin line of cases as its foundation
for ruling in a civil case.
Once it chose Griffin, however, the Court had to find a limiting principle to
answer the "flood gate" argument posed by the dissent.95 That principle is, of course,
the fundamental liberty accorded to family relationships. Thus, the Court
emphasized the many contexts in which it has acted to limit state controls or
intrusion on the family.96 The Court emphasized that cases involving family integrity
and decision making are distinct from the "mine-run" of cases. Thus, allowing a
forma pauperis procedure in these cases simply does not support expanding the same
right to ordinary civil cases.97
The mother in MLB asserted that "the accusatory state action she is trying to fend
off is barely distinguishable from criminal condemnation," and she suggested that
her TPR appeal be treated as the court treated petty-offense appeals.9" Examining
Mayer v. Chicago," the Court could not find any way to not extend the concept to
TPR cases."° As the Court noted, "Like a defendant resisting criminal conviction,
she seeks to be spared from the state's devastatingly adverse action. That is the very
reason we have paired her case with Mayer.......o The dissent did not disagree that
Mayer supported, indeed mandated, the majority decision; it asserted instead that
Mayer (and perhaps Griffin) was wrongly decided and should be reversed, leaving
a somewhat cleaner division between civil and criminal cases. 102
93. Id. at 120.
94. Id. at 118.
95. Id. at 141 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
96. Id. at 115 (holding that persons seeking a divorce cannot be prevented from filing their petition because
they cannot afford the court costs).
97. Id. at 116.
98. Id. at 119-20.
99. 404 U.S. 189 (1971) (extending Griffin to cases in which the defendant did not face incarceration).
100. MLB, 519 U.S. at 123. The court stated,
It would be anomalous to recognize a right to a transcript needed to appeal a misdemeanor
conviction-though trial counsel may be flatly denied-but hold, at the same time, that a
transcript need not be prepared for M.L.B.-though were her defense sufficiently complex, state
paid counsel, as Lassiter instructs, would be designated for her.
Id.
101. Id. at 125 (citing with approval United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973) (refusing to find a
constitutional requirement to waive fees to file for bankruptcy); Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656 (1973) (refusing
to find any constitutional difficulty in requiring welfare recipients to pay a filing fee to obtain court review of
agency action reducing their benefits)).
102. Id. at 141 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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Thus, the Meyer v. Nebraska line has begun to have a real impact on the way
states conduct abuse-and-neglect cases. The existence of a "fundamental right" in
family matters has taken a course the Court in 1923 did not and probably could not
have foreseen. The remainder of this article explores a way to analyze requests for
extension of criminal law analogs into TPR substance and procedure and suggests
the limits of the process.
C. A Suggested Analytical Approach
The United States Supreme Court's latest pronouncement on the constitutional
status of parental rights, Troxel v. Granville, emphasizes the increasing influence of
Meyer. 3 Unabashedly noting that the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment includes a "substantive component that 'provides heightened protection
against government interference with certain fundamental rights and liberty
interests,""' the Court observes that the interest of parents in the care, custody, and
control of their children is "perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests
recognized by" it. "05
Starting from the Troxel notion that "it cannot now be doubted"' 6 that the right
of parents to make decisions about their children is constitutionally protected, the
working hypothesis of this article is that termination of parental rights calls for
greater procedural protections than are normally available in civil proceedings."°7
Greater procedural protection implies greater formality, more stringent standards,
and more limits on state action. With the exceptions already noted, and more to be
seen, the courts have slowly followed this path, increasingly relying on criminal law
cases and concepts. The courts have relied on the criminal law because the civil
precedents simply do not address the issues raised by state intrusions on
constitutionally protected interests. Criminal prosecution is the archetype of state
intrusion on liberty. TPR proceedings, of course, are not criminal cases and no one
is suggesting that the criminal law be "imported wholesale" to the TPR arena.'
How then should courts decide which parts of the criminal law are appropriate to
adopt and which are not?
I suggest a modification of the familiar Mathews tool." 9 We have already seen
the Mathews test put to work in Lassiter and Santosky, though in slightly different
ways and to different effects. The Supreme Court has not resorted to Mathews in all
of its parental rights cases. For example, it did not mention Mathews in the putative
father cases, Quilloin, Lehr, Caban, or Michael H., because the issue there was
103. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000).
104. Id. (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997)).
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Some commentators disagree with this assertion. The growth of the alternative dispute resolution
movement has found expression in TPR cases also. See Sinden, supra note 1, for an exhaustive examination of the
arguments in favor of more informal procedures in abuse-and-neglect cases. While acknowledging the facial
attractiveness of everyone getting along and working toward a common goal for the safety of children, the realities
of the process lead Sinden to conclude that increased informality is not a workable approach. Id.
108. Id. at 372.
109. See Sinden, supra note 1. While Sinden suggested a need for some adjustment to the Mathews test in
TPR cases, she did not pursue it in any detail, probably because that was not the focus of her article.
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whether the father had any liberty interest at all, and thus, whether he was due any
process at all. These cases and issues aside, Mathews provides the only extant test.
State courts have also started applying Mathews as they struggle with the
implications of Lassiter, Santosky, and MLB." 0
Mathews is a three-part evaluative test used generally to determine what process
is due in a given circumstance. The test purports to (1) evaluate the weight or value
of the private interest at stake, (2) consider whether the risk of an erroneous decision
is increased by the procedures used as well as the utility of additional or substitute
safeguards, and (3) consider the state's interest. The state's interest has two aspects.
The first is the financial burden imposed by additional safeguards. Generally, but
not always, the added financial burden is considered de minimis and constitutionally
irrelevant."' The second and more important is the matter of additional obstacles
placed on the state in achieving its ends." 2
The three Mathews factors act as legal gravity waves, sometimes contending with
one another to pull in opposite directions, sometimes combining to push the decision
in one direction. The difficulty, of course, is in assigning a value and a direction to
the factors as circumstances and issues change. As noted in Santosky, shifts in value
and direction are inevitable even in the same case. Also, the test did not originate in
a context in which there arguably are three persons whose interests are at stake: the
State, the parent, and the child.
Except in the putative father cases, there is no question that the parents'
fundamental liberty interest forcibly suggests that procedural and substantive due
process protections for them should be maximized. This pressure remains constant
at least until a court makes a finding of unfitness sufficient to warrant termination.
Thereafter, the force of the parents' interest diminishes somewhat, though the
reduction is likely to have little effect on procedures on appeal.
The state's interest is more problematic but it is generally viewed as equal in
weight to the parents'. Generally, the state has no right to intrude on the parent/child
relationship in the abuse-and-neglect context unless and until intervention is
necessary to protect the child. The state's non-financial interest is thus derived from
a combination of its parens patriae obligation toward its citizens and its police power
to prevent harm. As a matter of policy, the state's duty in pursuing an abuse-and-
neglect case should not be simply and solely to sever the family relationship. Its
duty should be to attempt to remedy the perceived problem first and seek
termination only when remedial efforts fail or are shown to be futile.' ' In this
regard, the role of the child welfare bureaucracy is much like that of the criminal
110. See e.g., CYFD v. Anne McD., 128 N.M. 618, 995 P.2d 1060 (Ct. App. 2000); CYFD v. Stella P., 127
N.M. 699, 986 P.2d 495 (Ct. App. 1999); Cynthia D. v. Superior Court, 851 P.2d 1307 (Cal. 1993); In re A.P., 692
A.2d 240 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997); In re K.L.J., 813 P.2d 276 (Alaska 1991); In re Shaquanna M., 61 Conn. App. 592
(Conn. App. Ct. 2001).
111. In MLB, however, the Supreme Court actually calculated the estimated cost of providing transcripts to
indigent parents.
112. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
113. This is the model of intervention followed by current abuse-and-neglect statutes. I rely on the New
Mexico statute as a representative sample and have made no effort to survey the statutes in all fifty states. See N.M.
STAT. ANN. §§ 32A-3A, 3B and 4 (1978). The Federal Adoption & Safe Families Act has imposed some more
stringent time lines on the process but has not altered the basic obligations of the states. Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111
Stat. 2115.
Spring 2002]
NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW
prosecutor whose ethical and legal duty is broader than winning a conviction.
Rather, the prosecutor's duty is to do justice.
The analogy is not perfect. The prosecutor's responsibility runs more to society
as a whole. Prosecutors vindicate societal interests primarily and the direct victim's
interests only secondarily. The child welfare system focuses much more on the
needs of individual children. Societal concerns are assumed to be served by
protection of the particular child.
Perhaps because the parens patriae and police power interests of the state are
much more individualized in TPR cases, most Mathews analyses tend to equate or
merge the child's interests with the state' s. "4 The United States Supreme Court paid
some attention to the potential independent role of the child's interests in
Santosky,"5 but in the end the Court did not assess the impact of the child's interest
separately. Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Santosky discusses the countervailing
interests of the child at length to argue that the preponderance standard is preferable
because anything more strict unduly favors parents, thus placing too much of the
risk of error on the child. While the dissent lingers on this point, it is clear that the
child is actually being used as a proxy for the state's interest in that it reflects a two-
party model of the interests at stake.1 6 The debate in Santosky between the majority
and the dissent simply places the child on one side or the other of the dispute.
For purposes of the Mathews calculation, the competing interests of the parent
and the state/child are usually valued equally, leaving risk of error as the deciding
factor."7 Viewing TPR cases as simply dichotomous matters, antagonist versus
protagonist, in fact emphasizes risk of error almost to the exclusion of other factors.
This need not be the only Mathews model. If the child's interest is seen and treated
as separate, it might provide a means of tipping the balance, producing a clearer
solution than the two-sided approach is able to muster.
Thus, one of the questions this article seeks to answer is whether the child's
interest can be factored independently into a Mathews analysis. The only scholarly
commentator to address the issue directly believes that "denominating the child's
interest as a separate factor does not further the inquiry.""' 8 Sinden argues that the
level of abstraction needed to "craft generally applicable rules about the procedure
of protections to be applied in" TPR cases makes separate consideration of the
child's interest impossible." 9 In her view, the children's interests necessarily
become identified with the primary combatants, the parents and the state, and the
combatants' interests are treated as proxies for whatever concern the child may have.
114. See CYFD v. Anne McD., 128 N.M. 618,995 P.2d 1060 (2000); see also Sinden, supra note 1, at 368-
73. Interestingly, the child's interests are rarely, if ever, identified with the parents'.
115. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 759 (1982).
116. Id. at 788-91 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
117. See e.g., CYFD v. Anne McD., 128 N.M. 618,995 P.2d 1060 (Ct. App. 2000); CYFD v. Stella P., 127
N.M. 699, 986 P.2d 495 (Ct. App. 1999).
118. Sinden, supra note 1, at 370-71. The Sinden article is the only one I have found that deals with the issue
in a legal framework. Other commentators bemoan the fact that children seem to be sidelined and subordinated by
the law in general, perhaps especially in the TPR process, but they do not offer any concrete suggestions for
including their interests in the process. See Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Hatching the Egg: A Child-Centered
Perspective on Parents' Rights, 14 CARDoZO L. REV. 1747 (1993).
119. Sinden, supra note 1.
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One need not subscribe fully to the notion that our legal system even today treats
children as objects, property to be possessed and molded, to acknowledge that
current paradigms of parental rights versus state duties do not allow much room for
independent consideration of the child's interests, but the prospects for including the
child's interests in some explicit way are not so dire. Doing so poses difficult issues
but is neither impossible nor farfetched. One must first acknowledge the reality that
the child's interests are not necessarily coincident with either the parents' or the
state's interests. 2' Responding to Professor Woodhouse' s rhetorical question, "Who
owns the child?", the answer in a very practical sense is that no one fully does. No
one is in exclusive control of the bundle of legal claims and human attributes that
constitute the child. There are limits to parental hegemony, 2' though change has
come slower than some would prefer.'22
There are also limits to the state's parens patriae interest. First, we do not live in
a Platonic society, and children are not mere creatures of the state.123 Second, there
is the obvious practical limit that the state may err in asserting that a child is abused
or neglected or abandoned. In that instance, the state's interest cannot be said to be
identical to the child's. Third, there is a deeper problem, identified in In re Gault,
with the parens patriae concept.124
The Supreme Court in Gault asserted that parens patriae has been overused as a
basis for state control of children and refuted use of the doctrine almost entirely in
the area of juvenile crime. TPR proceedings are not juvenile crime cases, but, given
the historic link between delinquency, dependency, and neglect cases, Gault
weakens parens patriae as a basis for removing children from families to state
custody. Parens patriae, the idea of the state as substitute parent, certainly cannot be
the sole basis for state intervention and removal; a finding of parental unfitness or
abandonment is probably now required constitutionally.'25
120. See Oldfield v. Benavidez, 116 N.M. 785, 790, 867 P.2d 1167, 1172 (1994) (finding that a child has
fundamental rights that often compete with the parents' interests).
121. See, e.g., Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979) (holding that while parents retain a substantial role in the
decision to admit a minor child to a state mental hospital, they cannot do so by fiat; the decision must be subject
to an independent medical judgment and to review by a neutral fact finder); Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri
v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (invalidating a state statute requiring pregnant minors to obtain written parental
consent before having an abortion). But see Belotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979) (allowing parental abortion
consent statute to stand if further procedures are available).
122. See Woodhouse, supra note 26, at 1050-59; see also N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-4-10 (1978) (declaring
that "[a] child subject to the provisions of the Children's Code is entitled to the same basic rights as an adult, except
as otherwise provided in the Children's Code" and providing for appointment of a guardian ad litem for children
at the inception of abuse-and-neglect proceedings).
123. 262 U.S. 390, 401-02 (1923).
124. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1967). Prior to Gault it was generally thought that juveniles had no right
to liberty in the criminal context. Rather, they had a right to custody, the right to have someone take care of him or
her. If the parents could not do so, the state would. Id. at 17.
125. See Woodhouse, supra note 26; see also Catherine E. Campbell, The Neglected Child: His and His
Family's Treatment Under Massachusetts Law and Practice and Their Rights Under the Due Process Clause, 4
SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 632 (1970); see also, Note, Neglected Children and Their Parents in Indiana, 7 IND. L. REv.
1048 (1974). It is almost impossible to conceive of a court today issuing an opinion like the following: Painter v.
Bannister, 140 N.W.2d 152 (Iowa 1966) (refusing to give seven-year-old to his fit, if arty, Bohemian father because
the "best interests" of the child would be served if he stayed with his "stable, conventional," middle-class
grandparents); In re Morrison, 144 N.W.2d 97 (Iowa 1966) (terminating parental rights because of parents'
"emotional instability," even though children were clean, well-fed, their physical home life was average, they
attended church frequently, and there was no evidence the parents' discord was directed at the children); State ex
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After acknowledging at least a claim by children to interests separate from parent
and state, the claim must be given content. While not exhaustive, the child's interest
must at least include the following: (1) the right to physical and mental health and
integrity; (2) the right to maintain familial connections, where safe, with parents and
siblings; (3) the right to be heard by the decision maker either directly or through
counsel or a guardian ad litem; (4) the right to decisions from the fact finder in a
time frame meaningful to and reasonable for the child; and (5) the right to effective
representation by the guardian ad litem and counsel. At times these interests are
likely to impinge at a level general enough to affect decisions about the applicability
of basic potential procedural protections a parent might request. At other times the
child's interests might affect how an acknowledged parental right might be applied
in a particular case. For example, New Mexico's statutes currently require the state
to provide rehabilitative services to parents prior to seeking termination on abuse-
and-neglect grounds. The child's interest in having a decision made within a
reasonable time frame might affect the court's decision concerning the
reasonableness of the efforts undertaken by the state or whether further efforts
would be futile.'26
There is no need to attempt to catalog all of the potential effects of making the
child's interest a separate consideration. The normal flow of litigation will provide
appropriate vehicles for discussing issues as they arise. It is useful, however, to
explore how a child-integrated Mathews test might work. Despite her lack of
confidence in the utility of factoring the children's interests separately in the
Mathews analysis, Sinden's article provides a good first stab at an approach.'27 The
article suggests that, where procedural protections will tend to improve the accuracy
of the decision without shifting the risk of error, the procedure should be
implemented because to do so serves everyone's interest.'28 Where, however, a
procedure increases the risk of error, or more accurately, harm, to the child, the
gravitational pull of the child's interest urges at least caution and, in appropriate
cases, denial of the procedural advantage to the parent.'29
Two cautions are necessary in considering the approach I suggest. First, the
child's interests in a Mathews analysis is not the same as the "best interests" rubric.
The broad set of factors that comprise "best interests" is an overarching concern
most appropriately applied as a proper and necessary ingredient of the decision
whether and how to interrupt the parent/child relationship. 3 ' "Best interests"
rel Bethell v. Kilvington, 45 S.W. 433 (Tenn. 1898) (child sent to industrial school because mother was a woman
of "ill repute"); In re Williams' Welfare, 117 P.2d 202 (Wash. 1941) (child found dependent even though adoptive
mother (grandmother] was "intensely devoted" to child, had properly taken care of her, and was concerned for her
welfare).
126. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-4-21(B), 28(B) (1978).
127. Sinden, supra note i, at 371-72.
128. Whether any change in procedure can be accomplished without shifting the risk of error is problematic
since any change makes it more difficult for one party or the other to make its case.
129. Sinden, supra note 1, at 370-72.
130. In New Mexico, it is in fact statutorily mandated as part of the decision-making process for the children's
court whenever it makes a decision concerning custody and reunification of the family. See N.M. STAT. ANN. §§
32A-4-20E, 22E, 25, 25.1, 27, 28A (1978); see also In re Samantha D., 106 N.M. 184, 186, 740 P.2d 1168, 1172
(Ct. App. 1987) (finding that any rights parents have to their children are secondary to the best interests and welfare
of the child).
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includes all of the considerations presumably taken into account by the fact finder
in deciding the ultimate question of termination or a return home in light of the
court's findings as to parental fitness. A full listing is not possible, but it surely
includes the particular needs of the child and the parents' ability to provide them,
the progress of the parent in addressing the problems that prompted intervention; the
likely future progress of the parent/child relationship, etc. The interests pertinent to
a Mathews analysis overlap, but they are narrower and more attuned to questions of
accuracy, litigation advantage, burden of proof and production, and the child's
personal safety as the litigation proceeds.
Second, I acknowledge that adding the child's interests to Mathews may not help
advance the analysis. It will not necessarily provide any more certainty than is
inherent in the cost-benefit aspects of Mathews. Ultimate decisions will still be
largely value-driven. What the addition will do, however, is bring to the fore all of
the interests at work. It will also help to spur more considered thought on the
problem, helping to get beyond formulaic solutions such as the facial civil/criminal
distinction still commonly relied upon by the courts. With these qualifiers, I now
consider the application of my modified Mathews approach to specific issues that
arise in both the TPR and criminal contexts.
D. Specific Issues131
1. Right to Counsel
The right to counsel is perhaps the least controversial of the criminal law
encroachments on TPR cases. The constitutional right to counsel was recognized by
numerous states and lower federal courts before the issue came before the Supreme
Court in Lassiter. The right-to-counsel cases are notable not just for their holdings
but also for their practical resolution of the civil/criminal dichotomy. As the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals stated in Cleaver v. Wilcox:
Protection of a right as fundamental as that of child custody cannot be denied by
asserting that counsel in civil litigation has always depended upon the free
enterprise generalization that one usually gets what one pays for. The "civillitigation" generalization overlooks the nature of the rights in question and the
relative powers of the antagonists.'32
There is no real controversy about the basic right to counsel, and, though I have not
conducted a state-by-state survey, it is likely that most states have taken the
Supreme Court's advice in Lassiter and granted a per se right in every case, either
by statute or opinion, thus avoiding the problems inherent in case-by-case
determinations. 3 3 The case-by-case approach is unsupportable and unworkable.
131. In this part of the article I will lead discussions with New Mexico cases if they have dealt with the
subject.
132. 499 F.2d 940, 945 (9th Cir. 1974); see also V.F. v. State, 666 P.2d 42 (Alaska 1983); In re Jay R., 197
Cal. Rptr. 672, 678 n.7 (Cal. App. 1983); see also Joel Smith, Annotation, Right of Indigent Parent to AppointedCounsel in Proceedings for Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights, 80 A.L.R. 3rd 1141.
133. See William Wesley Patton, It Matters Not What Is But What Might Have Been: The Standard ofAppellate Review for Denial of Counsel in Child Dependency and Parental Severance Trials, 12 WHrrrIER L. REV.
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Applying the modified Mathews test would lead to finding a per se right since all
parties benefit by the increased accuracy provided by counsel without shifting the
risk of error to the detriment of the child.'34
Outstanding issues related to counsel involve representation on appeal and the
ramifications of ineffective assistance. The United States Supreme Court has not
addressed either problem and the decisions of the state courts are inconsistent. New
Mexico and other states have held that parents have a statutory right to counsel on
appeal.'35 Because the court in State v. Alicia P. relied on New Mexico's statute, it
did not consider any constitutional basis for the right. Other courts have found a
constitutional right to counsel on appeal.'36 The New Mexico court also held in
Alicia P. that appellate counsel had the ethical duty to advance all theories requested
by the parent even if counsel has no faith in them and would not otherwise assert
them in good faith, applying the criminal procedural rule to the same effect.'37 Thus,
New Mexico has extended .the full range of criminal right to counsel to TPR cases.
The issue is still open or has been decided to the contrary in other states. For
example, the Arizona Court of Appeals recently held that parents had no right to
have counsel file an Anders v. California brief on appeal.'38 Applying Mathews to
the issue, it is clear that limiting the right to counsel to something less than the
criminal standard is not supportable. All interests, including the child's, urge use of
procedures that maximize the efficacy of the adversarial litigation system. Counsel
is basic to that system and, in this regard, TPR cases are in all practical respects like
criminal cases.
The parallel between TPR and criminal cases with regard to ineffectiveness-of-
counsel issues is less clear. The states are split as to whether parents have a right to
effective counsel, and, if they do, what the effect of a finding of ineffectiveness
should be. That said, it should be noted that a strong majority of the states has held
that the criminal standard should be applied in TPR cases.'39
537 (1991); see also In re J.B. & R.B., 792 P.2d 753 (Colo. App. 1985) (holding that counsel must be provided at
all stages of the proceedings, not just at trial on motion to terminate). But cf. In re V.W., 958 P.2d 1132 (Colo. App.
1998) (holding that parent must request appointment of counsel; court has no obligation to appoint counsel sua
sponte).
134. This is asserted as an article of faith held by the author..There are many who question whether greater
adversarial proceedings result in greater accuracy.
135. See e.g., State v. Alicia P., 127 N.M. 664, 666, 986 P.2d 460,462 (1999) ("[W]e see no reason why the
legislature would have intended for those procedural protections to evaporate on appeal simply because it is an
indigent parent who seeks to pursue her rights to appeal."); In re T.V., 8 S.W.3d 448 (Tex. App. 1999).
136. See Farmer v. State, 784 P.2d 89, 91 (Okla. Ct. App. 1989) ("Because such an action is 'civil' by
description does not preclude granting parents in this situation rights equivalent to those granted a criminal
defendant under our constitutional protection of fundamental rights.").
137. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967) (holding that counsel on appeal in a criminal case may
have, in fact has, an obligation to advance all arguments the defendant may reasonably request, even if counsel
personally has no faith in them and would not otherwise assert them); see also State v. Franklin, 78 N.M. 127, 428
P.2d 982 (1967).
138. Denise H. v. Arizona Dep't of Economic Sec., 972 P.2d 241, 243 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1998) (drawing a
distinction between the Sixth Amendment right to counsel and the due process right that underlies appointment of
counsel in TPR cases).
139. See In re Termination of the Parental Rights of James W.H., 115 N.M. 256, 258, 849 P.2d 1079, 1081
(Ct. App. 1993); see also In re R.G., 518 N.E.2d 691,694 (11. App. 1988) (observing that "it would seem a useless
gesture on the one hand to recognize the importance of counsel [in TPR cases]...and, on the other hand, not require
that counsel perform effectively").
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State v. Tammy S. ' provides an example of the dilemma courts face. In Tammy
S. the court found ineffective assistance as a result of a conflict of interest-one
attorney was appointed to represent both mother and father, and their interests at
some point diverged. While acknowledging that in a criminal case the situation
would call for "outright reversal," the court was reluctant to do so, at least in the
context of that particular case: the mother's whereabouts were unknown and the
court was concerned the children would be left "in a state of permanent limbo."14'
The court instead remanded for a hearing on the merits of the mother's claim that
the conflict prejudiced her. The court observed that if the mother did not appear for
that hearing, finalization of the termination of parental rights would be appropriate.
If the mother did appear and prejudice was shown, she would be granted a
rehearing. 142 The court thus steered a middle course prompted by the apparent
disappearance of the parent.
Other courts have held that reversal is not an appropriate remedy, but they offer
no alternative response. 43 Still other courts refuse to find a right to effective
assistance. Texas, for example, has steadfastly denied recognition of the claim,
simply refusing to cross the criminal/civil line.'"
Applying Mathews, it is difficult to deny the application of the ineffective
assistance principle under the normal criminal standard. 145 The dynamics of the
parent-versus-state analysis are not changed by considering the child's interests,
with the possible exception of the remedy available. Holding counsel to a reasonable
standard of practice promotes accuracy and better advocacy by both sides. The
remedy of reversal for ineffective assistance is more difficult because it may
adversely affect the child's interest in a timely resolution. Is the delay generally
worth the price it exacts? The answer in most cases is that it is. Delaying finality is
not necessarily contrary to the child's best interests. As the court in Emilye A. v.
Ebrahim A. observed,
However, the implicit and erroneous assumption on which this reasoning [that
reversal is improper] is based is that the child's welfare has been served by the
interruption of the parents' custody and control despite the fact that the child's
parents were not effectively represented during the proceedings. Can it be said
that it is in the best interest of a child to be taken from the accustomed custody
and control of his or her parents when there has not been a fair hearing related
to the need for such intervention? 46
There are, moreover, ways to reduce delay. The problem of interminable foster care
is being addressed by the states as they revise their statutes and by Congress in The
Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997. Delay in general has thus decreased. In the
appellate scenario, a common problem with ineffectiveness claims is the lack of a
140. 126 N.M. 664, 974 P.2d 158 (1999).
141. Id. at 669, 974 P.2d at 163.
142. Id. at 670, 974 P.2d at 163-64.
143. In re Mary S., 230 Cal. Rptr. 726, 728-29 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
144. See Howell v. Dallas County Child Welfare Unit, 710 S.W.2d 729 (Tex. App. 1986), cert. denied, 481
U.S. 1018 (1987).
145. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
146. 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d 294, 301 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992).
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sufficient record to decide the issue. In the criminal arena, such defendants usually
are relegated to their habeas corpus remedy.'47 In the civil arena, post-trial Rule
60(B) motions are available and are potentially of more utility. They impose time
limits and are a familiar instrument to the trial courts. Use of Rule 60(B) motions
has been approved in a few cases.148 Encouragement of the use of Rule 60(B)
motions prior to appeal would resolve most cases more expeditiously at the trial
level. States such as New Mexico, which have separate rules of procedure for their
"children's courts," would be well-advised to consider including a version of Rule
60(B) in them. The procedure followed in Tammy S. of a remand for a hearing to
determine prejudice also recommends itself.
2. Standard of Proof
As we have already seen, the United States Supreme Court held that proof by
clear and convincing evidence of all findings necessary to terminate parental rights
is constitutionally required. The standard is now embedded in most, but not all, state
TPR statutes. The California Supreme Court49 has refused to follow Santosky,
distinguishing it on the basis of the difference between the New York statutory
scheme at play in Santosky and the latest California TPR statute. 0 The California
court first reviewed the issue in In re Angelia P.,"' a case arising under the prior
California statute. InAngelia P., the California court accepted and adopted Santosky.
Clearly impressed with the legislature's work thereafter, the California Supreme
Court essentially held in Cynthia D. that California had eliminated all of the
procedural and substantive looseness that prompted the Santosky holding, thus
reducing materially the risk of error and obviating the need for a high standard of
proof. 
52
The dissent in Cynthia D. points out that the new statute does not obviate the
Santosky rationale because key findings supporting termination are made at periodic
review hearings under a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard. These interim
findings are not subject to challenge during the final termination/disposition hearing.
Because the statute thus allows termination based on parental fitness findings made
on a preponderance standard, the dissent finds that this approach does not
sufficiently honor the liberty interest at stake, increases the risk of error, and is not
very different from the New York statute in Santosky. '"
Under a child-based Mathews analysis, the California Supreme Court decision is
suspect. The parent and state interests are constant as described in Santosky. The
child's interests in safety and prompt resolution are specifically addressed and
147. Habeas corpus used to be a common vehicle to test child custody. It is no more.
148. See, e.g., Ex Parte E.D., 777 So. 2d 113 (Ala. 2000); In Interest of D.J.H., 401 N.W.2d 694 (N.D. 1987)
(revealing a disturbing lack of sensitivity to the appearance of impropriety and actual attorney conflict); Galloway
v. Lucas County Children's Servs. Bd., 1993 WL 93494 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 31, 1993); In re Brake, 493 S.E.2d
418 (N.C. 1997).
149. 1 am aware of no other state that has rejected Santosky.
150. Cynthia D. v. Superior Court, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 698, 704 (1993).
151. 171 Cal. Rptr. 637 (1981).
152. The California statute was changed primarily to focus on custody and termination decisions regarding
the physical, emotional, and moral welfare of the child. See Cynthia D., 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 700-02.
153. Id. at710-12.
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protected in the statute itself. How this particularized statutory attention works to
decrease the rigor with which the ultimate findings supporting termination should
be proven is not apparent. The statute's greater measure of protection of the child
should not create pressure to shift the risk of error further against the parent. In
short, the statutory procedure provides no reason to lower the standard of proof."M
On the other hand, a child-enhanced Mathews analysis argues against imposition
of the criminal-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard. Only one state high court has
imposed the beyond-reasonable-doubt standard. 5 5 The criminal standard is designed
to place the risk of error in prosecution almost entirely on the state. In the criminal
context, the policy decision has been made that it is better to free a guilty person
than to convict an innocent person. This policy assumes there is no identifiable third
party interest at play. Shifting the risk of error in favor of the parents to this degree
would unduly shift the risk of error against the child. Weighing the child's interest
in physical and mental health and safety argues strongly against shifting the risk of
error so dramatically.
3. Notice, Waiver, Opportunity to Appear and Defend
Problems concerning appearance at trial by parties and witnesses fall into three
general categories: (1) failure of a parent to appear for no apparent reason or reasons
ostensibly within his or her control, (2) failure of a parent to appear for reasons
beyond his or her control, and (3) presentation of evidence by means other than live
testimony at trial. In the criminal arena, defendants have a right under the Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendments to be present at every stage of the trial and to personally
confront witnesses.'56 Of course, the right is not absolute and is subject to waiver. 57
Waiver can be found only upon explicit consideration by the trial court of the
reasons for the absence, weighing the circumstances against the competing public
interest affected by postponement and delay.'58 The state bears the burden to
demonstrate a reasonable basis for finding waiver or a lack of undue prejudice as a
result of proceeding to trial without the criminal defendant present.1 59
Should these protections apply in some form in TPR cases? New Mexico has held
in at least three cases that parents are entitled to something akin to a criminal right
to be present and confront witnesses. State v. Ruth Anne E. '6 involved a father who
was incarcerated outside the State of New Mexico. Efforts to transport him to the
hearing failed. Father's counsel requested a continuance in order to provide more
time to arrange transportation. The trial court refused the continuance and proceeded
to trial. Noting that no state has found an absolute right that incarcerated parents be
transported to the termination hearing personally, the Court of Appeals also found
154. The court's rationale has a bootstrap quality to it. The opinion in essence says, "We do it better, so we
do not have to work so hard to prove we are doing it better or right." It should be remembered that New York was
quite proud of its statutory scheme and made the same argument in Santosky.
155. State v. Robert H., 393 A.2d 1387 (N.H. 1978).
156. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965); N.M. DIST. CT. R. CRIM.
P. 5-612 (2001).
157. State v. Clements, 108 N.M. 13, 765 P.2d 1195 (Ct. App. 1988).
158. Id.
159. Id
160. 126 N.M. 670,974 P.2d 164(1999).
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that the majority of states requires the parent be provided reasonable alternative
means of participating in the hearing.'6 '
Applying the Mathews test, particularly emphasizing the risk-of-error factor, the
New Mexico court held that incarcerated parents are entitled to more than just the
right to cross-examine witnesses and be represented by counsel. The parent has a
"right to meaningful participation in the hearing."'' 62 Meaningful participation
implies more than third-party representation. The court suggested that appropriate
measures might be active telephonic participation and an opportunity to review the
testimony by witnesses against him before having to respond.
163
The New Mexico courts were presented with a different problem in State v. Stella
P. " There, the mother had a history of mental illness. As a result, a guardian ad
litem and an attorney were appointed to represent her interests. The mother did not
attend the termination hearing "because it was Halloween and she felt ill and
afraid."'65 The trial court refused a continuance when neither the guardian ad litem
nor the mother's attorney provided any explanation for her absence. Applying the
Mathews test, and again concentrating on the risk-of-error factor, the Court of
Appeals held that it was improper for the trial court to infer from the mother's
absence that she had voluntarily and unequivocally intended to waive her right to
contest the proceeding. 66
The state urged the court to adopt and apply the civil default rules in TPR cases.
The court specifically rejected that suggestion, holding that "[m]inimum
consideration of due process requires the children's court to inquire explicitly and
on the record as to whether Mother validly intended to waive her right to contest the
termination."" The court analogized the inquiry that was made by the trial court to
the inquiry required when a criminal defendant enters a guilty plea.1
68
In State V. Steven, 169 the New Mexico Court of Appeals addressed yet another
variant. In Steven, the mother was unable to appear because she had been deported
to Mexico about a month prior to the termination hearing. Counsel informed the
court of her deportation but failed to ask for a continuance and did not object to
holding the hearing as scheduled. The Steven opinion imposed on the trial court a
responsibility to make the inquiry suggested in Stella P., consider circumstances of
the mother's absence and explore arrangements for the mother's meaningful
participation at a future hearing. 7' Recognizing that delay was a concern, the
opinion ordered a rehearing within a reasonable time, noting that "[d]ue process
does not require that the parties move heaven and earth to contact mother."'
' 71
161. Id. at 675, 974 P.2d at 169.
162. Id. at 677, 974 P.2d at 171.
163. Id. at 678, 974 P.2d at 172; see also In re L.V., 482 N.W.2d 250, 257-59 (Neb. 1992).
164. 127 N.M. 699, 986 P.2d 495 (1999).
165. Id. at 702, 986 P.2d at 498.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 705, 986 P.2d at 501.
168. Id.; see N.M. DIST. CT. R. CRIM. P. 10-307(c) (2001) (detailing the procedure to be followed in children's
court when a parent enters admissions or proves a consent decree); see also N.M. DIST. CT. R. CRIM. P. 5-303(E),
(F) (2001) (detailing how a guilty plea should be accepted).
169. 128 N.M. 304, 992 P.2d 317 (1999).
170. Id. at 307, 982 P.2d at 320.
171. Id. at 308, 992 P.2d at 321.
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Other states have struck a somewhat different balance. For example, in In re
V.M.R. and R. WR., 72 the respondent father was incarcerated in Kansas at the time
of his termination hearing. No effort was made to secure his presence at the hearing
in Colorado, and the hearing proceeded without him or his participation. The court
in In re V.M.R. and R. W.R. rejected the applicability of any criminal standard and
rejected any right on the part of the father to be present. The court stated,
"Courtroom confrontations with one's civil adversary are not required either by due
process or other constitutional strictures. The Sixth Amendment right to
confrontation applies to criminal cases; there is no similar right in a civil trial."'73
In In re A.P.,74 the Pennsylvania court struck a similar balance. Again, the
respondent father was incarcerated and no effort was made to bring him to the
hearing. In contrast to the Colorado case, the father was at least allowed to testify
and participate telephonically. Rejecting any application of or parallel with the Sixth
Amendment right to appear and confront witnesses, the court held that the
telephonic appearance was sufficient to protect his interest in the case. 71
A child-based Mathews analysis supports the New Mexico approach over the
Colorado approach. Again, the parents' and the state's interests remain constant. The
child's interest in prompt resolution is potentially negatively affected, but not
necessarily so. At bottom, posing a requirement that the court explicitly consider the
reasons for the parent's non-appearance enhances everyone's interest in the accuracy
of the outcome. Upon a thorough consideration of the reasons for non-appearance,
the court may find a valid reason for non-appearance. If so, no one's interests are
served by proceeding to trial. If, after thorough consideration, the court finds no
good cause for the non-appearance, it can proceed to trial, and again no one's
interests, except the parents', are negatively affected. On balance, the enhancement
of accuracy and reduction of error suggest caution before proceeding to trial without
the parents' participation in some form, unless the resulting delay is too long given
the circumstances of the child.
Whether parents have a right to confront witnesses similar to the criminal Sixth
Amendment right implicates all of the same considerations we have just discussed.
There are few reported cases considering the issue. The best treatment of the issue
is found in a recent New Mexico case, In re Anne McD.'76 There, the trial on the
merits was scheduled to be held in Grant County in the extreme southwestern comer
of the state. The state sought to present the trial testimony of six of its seven
witnesses by telephone, pursuant to statutory authorization.' The witnesses
proposed to be present by telephone included treating medical personnel and
experts.
172. 768 P.2d 1268 (Colo. Ct. App. 1989).
173. Id. at 1270.
174. 692 A.2d 240 (Pa. 1997).
175. id. at 243.
176. 128 N.M. 618, 995 P.2d 1060 (2000).
177. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-1 -18(E) (1978) (amended 1995) ("In any proceeding under the Children's Code,
the court may allow a party or witness to the proceeding to participate by the use of electronic communications,
consistent with the rights of all parties to the proceeding and pursuant to rules promulgated by the supreme court.").
At the time of the trial, the court had not promulgated rules under this section.
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The court analyzed the question as a due process issue and identified six reasons
why witnesses should be required to testify live.'78 The court focused its attention
on the right of the respondent to confront witnesses. Applying Mathews, the court
held that telephonic testimony in this case did not materially increase the risk of
error to the mother. The court reached this conclusion by considering the cross-
examination of the telephonic witnesses actually conducted by the mother's
attorney. The court felt that the cross-examinations were sufficiently effective under
the circumstances to be considered a reasonable substitute for live testimony.
Analyzing the decision in Anne McD. under a child-enhanced Mathews analysis
would not change the balance or the result reached in Anne McD. The court's
resolution of the issue serves all of the child's interests, including his or her interests
in prompt resolution of the case.
The cases reviewed in this section clearly demonstrate that criminal law analogs
have a place in TPR cases. The use of criminal law procedures as a guide increases
accuracy, and our comfort level, without sacrificing the child's interest in safety and
promptness and without materially affecting the state's administrative interests.
Careful adaptation of the criminal rules simply results in a more "fundamentally
fair" process for everyone.
4. Fourth Amendment, Warrants, and the Exclusionary Rule
While it is clear that the Fourth Amendment protection from unreasonable search
and seizure applies in some form to TPR cases, the manner in which it should be
enforced is all but clear. Surprisingly, there have been few opinions dealing with the
problem, and none from the United States Supreme Court. The opinions are not
consistent in their treatment of the problem and their Fourth Amendment analysis
is subject to criticism. 7 9 These courts have obviously struggled with the
complications inherent in a situation that can resemble law enforcement search and
seizures, in particular when law enforcement officers accompany welfare personnel
178. Anne McD., 128 N.M. at 623, 995 P.2d at 1065. The court stated,
Requiring a witness to testify personally at trial serves a number of important policies and
purposes. A witness' personal appearance in court:
1. assists the trier of fact in evaluating the witness' credibility by allowing his or her demeanor
to be observed first-hand;
2. helps establish the identity of the witness;
3. impresses upon the witness, the seriousness of the occasion;
4. assures that the wimess is not being coached or influenced during testimony;
5. assures that the witness is not referring to documents improperly; and
6. in cases where required, provides for the right of confrontation of witnesses.
Id. at 623, 995 P.2d at 1065.
179. See Kohler v. State, 713 S.W.2d 141 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986) (asserting without citation or explanation that
the Fourth Amendment protections against searches only apply to searches conducted by law enforcement
personnel, thus affirming admission of testimony from a department of resources case worker who had accompanied
the police when the home was searched); see also Darryl H. v. Coler, 801 F.2d 893 (7th Cir. 1986) (agreeing that
physical inspection of a child in connection with the investigation of suspected abuse or neglect was once a search
and seizure covered by the Fourth Amendment, but upholding the searches as reasonable under the circumstances;
also holding that a warrant issued under the probable cause standard was not necessary); see also N.J. Div. of Youth
& Fain. Servs. v. Wunnenburg, 408 A.2d 1345 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1979) (holding that Fourth Amendment
applied to the state's entry into a home but that the statute allows intrusion when it is in the "best interest of the
child"; and further holding that a prior termination of parental rights occurring twenty-two months prior to the
search in question provided a reasonable basis for investigation and home intrusion).
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on the search, and the lack of any clear guidance from the Supreme Court's Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence, all overlaid with concerns for the safety and welfare of
the children involved. Unfortunately, the struggle did not produce an analysis or
approach that is easily transportable to other situations. The Texas and New Jersey
opinions are particularly unhelpful in their analytical approaches. 180
Fortunately, at least two commentators have reviewed the problem. While they
do not agree entirely in their approaches, they do provide in-depth analyses of the
Supreme Court's jurisprudence and its potential application in TPR cases.'' The
articles by Hardin and Beeman together provide a good overview of the search and
seizure law, comparing and contrasting the classic criminal search and seizure cases
with the Court's more recent administrative reasonable cause cases.
Hardin believes that the Fourth Amendment is applicable to home searches in
TPR cases. He asserts that the criminal probable cause standard is not appropriate
in most cases, but concedes that it would be necessary in those instances where the
search and seizure is conducted by law enforcement officers alone or with social
welfare workers. The involvement of law enforcement officers makes the search
close enough to a criminal investigation that full Fourth Amendment rights should
apply. Where the search is being conducted by social welfare workers only, he
perceives the expected conflict between the rights of parents and the need and desire
of the state to protect children. The standard Hardin suggests, however, is
contradictory and ultimately unsatisfactory. Relying primarily on criminal stop and
search cases, he proposes a reasonable suspicion standard that requires a
particularized and objective factual basis for conducting the search. He does not
explain how this standard can be squared with the reality that a significant number
of reports, which start TPR cases, are anonymous and necessarily vague-as would
be expected since reports of the incidents normally do not come from the parents or
the children.
Hardin also proposes a rule of thumb: "Where the report names or describes the
location of the child and the perpetrator and describes either specific maltreatment
inflicted upon the child or a specific behavior or condition of the child suggesting
maltreatment, it is probably sufficient to constitute a reasonable suspicion.' 8 2
Hardin does not reconcile this rule of thumb with his prior suggestion that
reasonable suspicion would require particularized and objective bases.
Beeman provides a thorough review of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence,
elucidating the Supreme Court's attempts over the years to adjust the Fourth
Amendment requirements to accommodate the burgeoning number of fields in
which the government has the power to enter a citizen's business and home to search
and inspect. Beeman concludes that the Fourth Amendment approach that best fits
180. The Texas case provides no analysis at all and the New Jersey holding simply begs the question by not
discussing the type of showing necessary to allow entry to the home.
181. Mike Hardin, Legal Barriers in Child Abuse Investigations: State Powers and Individual Rights, 63
WASH. L. REV. 493 (1988); Michael R. Beeman, Note, Investigating Child Abuse: The Fourth Amendment and
Investigatory Home Visit, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1034 (1989). Given the thoroughness of the coverage and the analyses
in these two articles, there is no point in attempting to reproduce the discussion here. I will therefore simply
summarize their suggested approaches and indicate which would be preferable using the child-enhanced Mathews
analysis.
182. Hardin, supra note 181, at 534.
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TPR cases is a modified application of the special needs administrative reasonable
cause standard described by the court in New Jersey v. T.L.O.'83 In T.L.O., the
Supreme Court held that because of the special relationship between school
administrators and students, and the need to maintain order in the schools, school
officials were not required to have probable cause in order to search students and
their lockers on campus. Beeman concedes that there is not a special relationship
between the state and parents of the kind found in T.L.O. He would probably
concede that there is a special relationship between the state and children, but
outside the school context the relationship would not be sufficient by itself to
support warrantless searches of the home. He suggests instead that the T.L.O.
standard of reasonable cause could be applied as a guide to the factual showing
required to support issuance of a warrant to search.' 84
Evaluating the two suggested approaches from the child's standpoint, the Beeman
approach is preferable. His approach de-emphasizes the need for detailed, objective,
corroborated information, which can be hard to obtain in TPR cases, and yet still
requires the state to go before a judicial officer for an objective evaluation of the
strength of the reasonable cause inference raised by the facts available to the
enforcing agency. This approach protects the values inherent in the Fourth
Amendment while not placing unduly high obstacles in the way of the state's ability
to protect its children.
Assuming the Fourth Amendment applies to TPR cases, the question must be
asked whether the exclusionary rule, which is the Supreme Court's prime method
of enforcing the Fourth Amendment, also applies. Beeman does not address this
issue. Hardin does, and, again, his discussion is comprehensive and need not be
repeated.185 Hardin notes that Supreme Court case law concerning application of the
exclusionary rule in civil case settings is inconsistent and provides little guidance
about its applicability in TPR cases.186
Hardin concedes that there is a need for an effective mechanism to assure that the
rights of families are respected by child welfare agencies and that the illegal
gathering of evidence is of great potential concern. He concludes, however, that the
negative effects of exclusion bring too high a price to apply the rule. In particular,
the prospect of the exclusionary rule allowing continuation of illegal and improper
conduct by abusive or neglectful parents is simply unacceptable. The concern that
a TPR case might be dismissed, leaving a child in danger, is the overriding
consideration in a child-based Mathews analysis.
There are other methods of protecting societal interests, including exclusion of
the evidence in the criminal proceeding paralleling the TPR case and the potential
for civil damages litigation against the offending officials. While the rights of
parents to be free from unreasonable searches at the hands of social welfare agencies
might not have been clearly established in 1985, at the time of the decision in Darryl
183. 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
184. Beeman, supra note 181, at 1062-67.
185. Hardin, supra note 181, at 588-600.
186. Id. at 590 (citing One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693 (1965); United States v.
Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976); INS v. Lopez-Mendosa, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984)).
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H. v. Gregory Coler, 7 it surely is now.' A Massachusetts case suggests yet
another approach.'89 There, the court disqualified the department from presenting
the Commonwealth's case after the department had acted improperly and the mother
had requested that certain evidence be excluded. The court ordered that a "licensed
child care agency" be appointed to investigate and present the petition.19°
5. Jury Trials
Criminal defendants are guaranteed trial by jury under the Seventh and
Fourteenth Amendments. Thus far, the courts have uniformly rejected any
constitutional right to a jury in TPR cases.' The Kansas court in Lennon v. Kansas
characterized its TPR proceedings as "parental" rather than criminal and therefore
not subject to trial by jury.19 2 The New Mexico court in State v. T.J. took a slightly
different approach in denying the claim. It noted first that TPR cases have
traditionally been viewed as equitable rather than legal actions, and as such are
subject to the ancient equitable practice of trial by the bench.'93
The mother also raised two due process arguments in T.J.: (1) the fundamental
nature of the interest at stake requires a jury and (2) the judge's familiarity with the
case could lead to improper prejudgment at the final termination hearing, given the
judge's deep acquaintance with the case. 94 The New Mexico court rejected the
fundamental parental interest argument by pointing out that the child too "has
fundamental rights that often compete with the parents."'95 Why or how the
competition of interests militates against a jury trial is not explained. The court
dismissed concerns about the judge's potential bias with a reference to McKeiver v.
Pennsylvania,96 a United States Supreme Court case holding that a jury trial is not
required in juvenile delinquency proceedings. The New Mexico court shared the
United States Supreme Court's concern in McKeiver that the jury trial court would
remove TPR cases from their status as a "protective proceeding while adding little
if any efficacy to the fact finding process."' 97
The New Mexico court is correct that historically TPR cases were deemed
equitable causes, but that does not argue strongly against finding a right to a jury
187. 801 F.2d 893, 902-03 (7th Cir. 1986).
188. In New Mexico, the issue has been addressed in the TPR statute. While the statute does not suggest a
need or a standard for search warrants generally, it does discuss Ex Parte custody orders. See N.M. STAT. ANN. §
32A-4-16 (1978). This section requires that an Ex Parte order be supported by a sworn written statement of facts
showing probable cause exists that the child is abused or neglected and that custody in the state is required under
statutory standards. This section further requires that the order be served by a "person authorized to serve arrest
warrants." Excluding the most extraordinary circumstances, there should be no need in New Mexico for further
search of the home.
189. Petition of Dep't of Soc. Servs. to Dispense with Consent to Adoption, 429 N.E.2d 685 (Mass. 1981).
190. Id. at 688.
191. See, e.g., State v. T.J., 123 N.M. 99, 934 P.2d 293 (Ct. App. 1997); Lennon v. Kansas, 396 P.2d 290
(Kan. 1964).
192. T.J., 123 N.M. at 293, 934 P.2d at 293.
193. Id. at 103-04, 934 P.2d at 297-98; see also Blanchard v. State, 29 N.M. 584, 586, 224 P. 1047, 1048
(1924).
194. T.J., 123 N.M. at 104, 934 P.2d at 298.
195. Id.
196. 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
197. Id.
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trial in view of the Supreme Court's elevation of parental rights to fundamental-
liberty status. It is one thing to deny a jury in a mortgage foreclosure case on purely
historical grounds; it is another to deny it when the basic nature of a proceeding has
been altered on a constitutional basis. In addition, concerns about negatively
affecting the protective or rehabilitative nature of the proceedings are unconvincing
given the adversarial tone of TPR cases, in particular at the termination hearing
where the parents' and state's interests are categorically opposed.
Just because the reasons given so far for not allowing trial by jury are suspect
does not provide a compelling reason by itself to change the rule, however. With its
deep historical, policy, and philosophical roots, trial by jury represents a choice that
decisions judging questionable conduct should be made by representatives of the
public, the people affected by the conduct. Trial by jury also represents a
philosophical choice that the people, rather than a specialized official, should decide
historical events in particular circumstances and decide whether these events deserve
opprobrium under applicable societal rules. Whether fact finding is objectively
enhanced by jury trial is open to question.
As a result, trial by jury is an issue that may not be fruitfully amenable to a
Mathews analysis. With the exception of the accuracy of fact finding, none of the
considerations supporting juries are well addressed by the Mathews analysis. It is
not apparent whether a jury trial advances or injures the parents' or the state's
interests in TPR hearings. As often happens, the deciding factor is whether the
procedure reduces or enhances the risk of error. Since there is no way to gauge that
effect, Mathewsjust is not helpful as a tool. The decision whether to allow jury trials
is best viewed as a matter of policy; that is, what would be preferable, rather than
required, to boost the public's and the parties' confidence in the process and its
results.'98 That discussion is beyond the scope of this article.
6. Double Jeopardy
In its broadest sense, double jeopardy protects a criminal defendant from facing
prosecution twice for the same acts.' I have located only one case discussing
application of double jeopardy in a TPR setting.2°° In Adoption of Iris, the parents
appealed the judgment terminating their rights. The appellate court reversed, holding
that the trial court's findings of fact were "regrettably sparse" and failed to meet the
clear-and-convincing proof standard. The appellate court remanded with direction
to the trial court to determine whether the state still sought termination and whether
there was sufficient additional evidence to warrant a new trial. The parents opposed
a new trial, asserting double jeopardy as a defense. The Massachusetts Court denied
the theory summarily because "custody proceedings are not criminal in nature."20
This result is correct under a Mathews analysis where the child's interests
predominate. The parents' interests remain centered on keeping their children. The
198. At one time, abuse-and-neglect cases were heard by a jury in New Mexico. See 1917 N.M. Laws, ch.
85, § 5. Right to trial by jury continued until enactment of the new Children's Code in 1972. See 1972 N.M. Laws,
ch. 97, § 71.
199. Swafford v. State, 112 N.M. 3, 810 P.2d 1223 (1991).
200. Adoption of Iris, 695 N.E.2d 645 (Mass. 1998).
201. Id. at 648.
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child's interest in safety argues strongly against a procedure that prevents the fact
finder from hearing all pertinent evidence, even if it requires more than one trial.
The balance struck in the criminal arena that it is better to acquit the guilty than to
convict the innocent, has little or no force where the "accused" has his potential
victim in his home subject to his control.
7. Speedy Trial
Because of widespread concern about the negative impact of long-term foster care
on children, state legislatures and Congress have recently made efforts to expedite
abuse proceedings. The Adoption and Safe Families Act2°2 places quite short time
frames on TPR cases. For example, it requires that a case plan be in place within
sixty days after a child is actually removed from the home and requires that a
permanency hearing be conducted within twelve months after the child enters foster
care.2 °3 In addition, the state social services agency is required to file a petition
seeking termination of parental rights if the child has been in foster care for fifteen
out of the most recent twenty-two months. 2°4
State legislatures have also placed tight time limits for critical events. Some took
the action prior to the coaxing inherent in the Adoption and Safe Families Act; some
are reacting to the Act. New Mexico, for example, has imposed stringent time limits
on adjudicatory hearings where the issue is whether the child has been abused and
neglected. 25 Section 32A-4-19 requires the following:
A. The adjudicatory hearing in a neglect or abuse proceeding shall be
commenced within sixty days after the latest of the following dates:
(1) the date that the petition is served on the respondent; if the trial court
orders a mistrial or a new trial, the date that the order is filed; or(2) if the trial court orders a mistrial or a new trial, the date that the order is
filed; or(3) in the event of an appeal, the date that the mandate or order is filed in the
district court disposing of the appeal....
D. When the adjudicatory hearing on any petition is not begun within the time
period specified in Subsection A of this section or within the period of any
extension granted, the petition shall be dismissed with prejudice.
The threat of dismissal with prejudice provides strong incentive to the state
agency to prepare for and conduct its hearings in a timely manner. The mandatory
language of the provision makes Section 32A-4-19 the equivalent of the six-month
rule in the criminal system.2' The six-month rule, of course, is the administrative
expression of the constitutional right to speedy trial.27 The deadline in Section 32A-
4-19 is, however, even more severe than the six-month rule in that there is no
explicit provision in the statute for extensions of time. The six-month rule may be
extended by the district court and the Supreme Court for good cause. Thus, in this
202. Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115; see also 45 C.F.R. §§ 1355-57.
203. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 675 (1992 & Supp. 2000).
204. Id.
205. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-4-19 (1978).
206. See N.M. R. ANN. 5-604 (2001).
207. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972).
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context at least, New Mexico has the equivalent of a speedy trial or six-month rule
limitation on state prosecution of TPR cases.
Should the speedy trial concept apply where the statute itself does not provide for
dismissal of the petition for failure to meet deadlines? At least two courts have
addressed the issue. In In re J.R.,2°8 the parents and the state of Vermont were
involved in a lengthy termination proceeding. The case was appealed twice and
remanded twice. After the remand from the second appeal, the trial court failed to
commence a dispositional hearing within the statutory time limits. The parents
moved that the entire case be dismissed on a theory resembling the notion of speedy
trial. The Vermont Supreme Court denied relief on the basis that the time limits of
the statute were simply directory and not mandatory. The In re J.R. court did not
reason by analogy to the criminal concepts of speedy trial and six-month limitations.
The Vermont court revisited the issue in In re M.C.P. 2°' Again rejecting the
notion that an untimely proceeding could result in its dismissal, the Vermont
Supreme Court added to the rationale it depended on in In re J.R., suggesting that
the "parent's right to speedy adjudication must be weighed with the child's best
interest.''21° The court noted that allowing delay to act to void a finding in favor of
termination would unduly elevate the parents' rights over the child's interests.
Finally, the court found that the parents had not demonstrated any actual prejudice
from the delay.
The Supreme Court of Nebraska similarly rejected a speedy trial claim.2"' The
parent in M.A. grounded his speedy trial theory in part on a provision in the TPR
statute that required that adjudication hearings be held within a six-month period
after the petition was filed.21 2 The Nebraska statutes provided that the six-month
period in the TPR statute "is to be calculated in the same manner as the six month
period is calculated in criminal cases under '29-1207." Despite this explicit parallel
between the criminal and the TPR case, the court refused to enforce the TPR six-
month rule in the same manner that a criminal six-month rule would normally be
enforced, that is, by dismissal. The court summarily rejected that assertion noting
that the speedy trial provisions apply only to criminal trials and the TPR proceeding
is not criminal in nature.
The Nebraska Supreme Court also relied on the distinction between provisions
that are mandatory and statutes that are merely directory; that is, that direct the
manner of doing something but do not implicate the essence of the authority for
doing it.2" 3
Viewing speedy trial claims through a child-based Mathews analysis parallels the
analysis by the Vermont Court in In re M.C.P. Everyone involved in a TPR
proceeding is concerned with and has an interest in speedy resolution. That interest
need not translate on constitutional grounds into mandatory dismissal if time lines
are not met. The risk of error imposed by dismissal is entirely on the children.
208. 570 A.2d 154 (Vt. 1989).
209. 571 A.2d 627 (Vt. 1989).
210. Id. at 637.
211. In re Interest of C.P., 455 N.W.2d 138 (Neb. 1990).
212. Id. at 142 (citing 1988 NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 43-278, 43-279.01(1)(f)).
213. In re C.P., 455 N.W.2d at 142-43.
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Again, the social policy decision that it is better to allow persons who have
committed a crime to be set free rather than subject them to unduly long
prosecutorial actions by the state does not apply in a TPR case, where the interest
of a particular individual potentially subject to harm at the hands of another
particular individual is at stake. The general societal willingness to free a wrongdoer
who does not have a specific potential future victim simply is not at play in TPR
proceedings.
8. Self Incrimination
The Fifth Amendment right protecting persons against self-incrimination is
implicated in at least two contexts in TPR cases. First, it can arise in the context of
testimony provided in hearings when parents testify and are cross-examined. The
second context is in the therapeutic portion of the proceedings. Whenever the
agency attempts to rehabilitate the family, treatment plans are formulated and the
parents' failure to comply with them necessarily negatively impacts their chances
of recovering their children.
The issue has arisen in the state courts with enough frequency to provide some
idea of potential outcomes. For example, the Vermont court in In re M.C.P.
considered an argument by parents that the disposition order "must be vacated
because it requires them to admit that they abused the juvenile in order to regain
custody, and this requirement violates their Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination."2 4 Consistent with its prior case law, the Vermont court held that the
privilege against self-incrimination applies in civil as well as criminal cases. It also
held that deprivation of custody of a child is a sanction sufficiently severe to invoke
the protections of the Fifth Amendment."5
The court recognized that TPR cases present a real dilemma. The court has an
interest in protecting the child; it would, in fact, be irresponsible to return the child
to an abusive situation. On the other hand, the child's parents cannot be compelled
to incriminate themselves in order to regain custody. 1 6 The court resolved the issue
by holding that the provision of the order requiring the parents to admit abuse would
be stricken, but upholding the order to the extent it continued custody of the child
with the state. The court emphasized that it was still the parents' burden to prove
that the abusive conditions leading to loss of custody had been overcome and placed
on the parents the obligation to find a way to carry their burden if they chose to
stand on their Fifth Amendment rights.2"7
214. 571 A.2d at 639.
215. Id. at640.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 640-41. The Vermont court relied for this procedure on a Minnesota case, In re J.W., 415 N.W.2d
879, 883 (Minn. 1987). The Minnesota court posed and resolved the problem this way:
But this is as far as the privilege extends protection. While the state may not compel therapy
treatment that would require appellants to incriminate themselves, it may require the parents to
otherwise undergo treatment. Therapy, however, which does not include incriminating
disclosures, may be ineffective; and ineffective therapy may hurt the parents' chances of
regaining their children. These consequences lie outside the protective ambit of the Fifth
Amendment.
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A New York court took a different approach to the issue.21 8 In Matter of Vance
A., the respondent parent argued that it was unconstitutional to force the TPR
proceeding to be conducted and tried at the same time that the pending criminal
proceedings were ongoing. The parent asserted that in order for her to give
testimony in the TPR proceedings, she would be forced to risk the use of her
testimony in the criminal proceedings. The court held that the Fifth Amendment
right was not threatened sufficiently to be applied because loss of their children was
not a necessary or inevitable consequence of the parent's failure or refusal to testify.
The court admitted that there was a risk for the parent in not protecting herself, but
it resolved the problem this way: "Thus the choice imposed on respondent by a
forthwith child abuse trial between the right to testify therein and the right against
self-incrimination, appears to fall in the category of choices that are constitutional
although difficult."2 9
The New York court also weighed the parents' claims of a Fifth Amendment right
against the child's interest in prompt conclusion of the TPR case. The court held that
as a matter of public policy the need for promptness further diminished the parents'
claims.
Other courts have taken a more doctrinaire approach to the question. In In re
M.S.,220 the court held that the Fifth Amendment privilege did not apply to parental
termination proceedings at all, absent questions that would directly subject the
parent to criminal sanctions.
The United States Supreme Court has addressed the issue only once.22' In
Baltimore City Dep 't. of Soc. Servs. v. Bouknight, the mother was held in contempt
of court and jailed for refusing to produce her son. The child had been found to be
in "need of assistance" and had been in the physical custody of the state before
being released to the mother's care. The mother asserted her Fifth Amendment rights
in support of her refusal to produce the boy. The Supreme Court held that the
privilege was not available to the mother on two grounds: (1) the order to produce
was issued pursuant to a general, non-criminal regulatory scheme; and (2) the
mother was in the same role as the custodian of records who assume a duty to
produce information within their control.222
The Bouknight opinion is narrow and technical. It is fact-specific in its handling
of the custodian of records rationale and arguably simply ignorant of the realities of
TPR proceedings. The opinion does not hold that the need to protect children is by
218. Matter of Vance A., 432 N.Y.S. 2d 137 (N.Y. Fain. Ct. 1980).
219. Id. at 141.
220. 360 N.W.2d 478 (Neb. 1984).
221. Baltimore City Dep't. of Soc. Servs. v. Bouknight, 493 U.S. 549 (1990).
222. Id. at 555-56. Bouknight has drawn criticism for its rationale. Most commentators have questioned the
aptness of the analogy to recordkeepers and the characterization of the TPR process as a general and non-criminal
regulatory scheme. At the same time, they decry the uncertainty created by the decision when applied to more
clearly applicable circumstances. See I.M. Rosenberg, Bouknight: Of Abused Children and the Parental Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination, 76 IOWA L. REV. 535 (1991); G.J. English, Child Abuse and the Fifth Amendment:
Baltimore City Dep't of Social Servs. v. Bouknight, 110 S. Ct. 900 (1990), 13 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 1017
(1990); see also W.W. Patton, The World Where Parallel Lines Converge: The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination
in Concurrent Civil and Criminal Child Abuse Proceedings, 24 GA. L. REV. 473 (1990); P. Varney, State v. Adams:
When Mommy Talks, You Better Pay Attention. And, If No Indictment Has Been Issued, You Can Use Her
Uncounseled Statements Against Her in Court, 76 N.C. L. REV. 2388 (1998).
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itself sufficient to overcome a person's Fifth Amendment privilege. In fact, the
Court is careful to point out that it is not deciding whether evidence gathered
through the forced disclosure could be used against the mother in a criminal
prosecution.223 Thus, Bouknight does not answer in any way the broad range of
issues that could arise in factual scenarios different from those present in Bouknight.
Like the jury trial issue, the Fifth Amendment issue is not readily resolvable on the
basis of balancing tests such as Mathews. The right against the self-incrimination is
heavily favored, as is the right of parents to the care, custody, and control of their
children. As noted by the Minnesota court, parents should not be forced into the
position of having to directly sacrifice their Fifth Amendment rights in order to
protect their parental rights. On the other hand, neither should parents be able to use
the Fifth Amendment as a shield blocking abuse-and-neglect proceedings. Assuming
the state is able to independently muster sufficient evidence to make a clear-and-
convincing showing that abuse and neglect has occurred, parents should not be able
to bring the proceedings to a halt because their defense imperils their Fifth
Amendment rights. Again, the interest of the child in physical and mental health is
the concern that impels completion of the TPR process.
Fortunately, this problem is increasingly being addressed by adoption of use-
immunity provisions. 24 The breadth and coverage of the use-immunity statutes are
entirely individual, and I will not attempt a survey of the entire fifty states. Suffice
it to say that to the extent immunity is limited, Fifth Amendment concerns are
certain to arise.
CONCLUSION
The neglected and abused child, like the poor, will always be with us. The
question is how to respond. The current incarnation of societal response emphasizes
a social welfare mechanism controlled by the state. The current approach
emphasizes, at least formally, treatment and rehabilitation prior to permanent
severance of family ties. Gone are the days when the state could act almost with
impunity on the theory that the state was just another parent. The process of crafting
a new standard of procedure is under way.
Importation of the criminal law to TPR cases is a predictable, if not inevitable,
development fueled by the constitutionally protected status of familial rights and the
increasing efforts by states to prevent and punish child abuse and neglect. The
preferred status of familial rights almost invites inquiry as to whether the procedures
applicable to "normal" civil cases are adequate. The personal stakes-family
integrity and child safety-are high enough to require serious review of the way the
courts process the cases. It is apparent to me that TPR cases are different and should
be handled differently.
The difficulty is in finding useful models. The civil procedure rules as such do
not readily suggest more stringent approaches. The only available analog is the law
of criminal procedure. It has been designed to give effect to our societal concern for
personal freedom embodied in the constitutional protections afforded the accused.
223. Bouknight, 493 U.S. at 561-62.
224. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-4-11 (1978 & Supp. 1993).
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The criminal model offers a type of stringency not found in civil cases, and yet it is
not a perfect fit for TPR cases either. TPR cases do not necessarily raise criminal
concerns. More importantly, TPR matters involve specific children in each case. The
criminal rules that place the onus of error on society may work to place that burden
unacceptably on the children. But, it is simply not useful to reject out of hand the
use of criminal law approaches that offer a ready source of familiar ideas that can
be adopted to fit the particular nuances of TPR cases.
Thus, while I accept the use of criminal law concepts in TPR cases as an
approach, there must be a way of filtering or adapting the criminal law to ensure that
it achieves the desired end: recognition of the importance of the interests being
invaded by the state while ensuring the safety and well-being of the child.
I have suggested a child-centered version of Mathews v. Eldridge as an analytical
tool. Used consistently, it provides a way of identifying and weighing all interests
at work, thus promoting predictability without hardening of that most flexible of
concepts: due process.225 Careful adoption of the criminal precedents applied with
the child's interest explicitly in mind will in the long run produce utilitarian
procedures that will protect all interests best.
225. There are many other areas where criminal law and procedure may be applicable to TPR proceedings.
Full consideration of all these subjects is simply not feasible in this article, but they have or will appear in the
reports as child protective agencies extend their areas of activities and as the time frames for resolution of these
cases shorten. Among them are (1) standards for accepting stipulations by parents that they did abuse and/or neglect
and/or abandon their children; (2) standards for effective waiver of counsel; (3) joinder issues; (4) confrontation of
witness issues and the hearsay rules; (5) statutory-void-for-vagueness claims; (6) issues concerning the extent of
the state's duty to disclose exculpatory information to parents, see Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); (7)
issues surrounding parental unfitness and whether the Constitution requires a finding of personal responsibility for
harm to children, see Jean Peter-Becker, Punishing the Passive Parent: Ending A Cycle of Violence, 65 U.M.K.C.
L. REV. 1003; (8) the effect, if any, of parental mental illness and whether there is a constitutional requirement to
appoint guardians ad litem for such parents; (9) whether the concept of effective representation applies to guardians
ad litem for children and parents; and (10) confrontation issues and the desire to protect sexually abused children
during testimony, see In re Michael C., 557 A.2d 1219 (R.I. 1989).
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